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HISTORICAL RESEARCH AND THE FUTURE OF SCHOLASTICISM
ETIENNE GILSON

SIGER OF BRABANT
FERNAND VAN STEENBERGHEN

THE ABSOLUTE OF HUMAN REASON IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF AUROBINDO
PAUL COLAÇO, S.J.

NOTES AND DISCUSSION

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HISTORICAL RESEARCH AND THE FUTURE OF SCHOLASTICISM

ETIENNE GILSON

What changes in our conception of Scholasticism have been brought about by fifty years or so of historical and critical research? What do these changes suggest about the future of Scholasticism? These are assuredly large questions; and my only excuse for attempting to answer them is that I accepted them exactly as they were put to me. There may have been temerity in my acceptance; but at least I hope you will not believe me rash enough to have assigned myself such a task.

It was in 1850—that is, a century ago—that Hauréau published his *De la Philosophie scolastique,* to be followed by his *Histoire de la philosophie scolastique* in 1872 and 1880. Since then studies on the medieval philosophies are without number. In 1900 there appeared De Wulf's *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale*; in 1905, Picavet's *Esquisse d'une histoire générale et comparée des philosophies médiévales*; in 1921, Grabmann's *Die Philosophie des Mittelalters*; in 1929, Geyer's *Die patristische und scholastische Philosophie.* Other titles easily come to mind, and this without including the many books devoted to the philosophies of St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Bonaventure, John Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham. But in the midst of such an abundance

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M. ETIENNE GILSON, of the Academie Française, Director of Studies at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, himself adapted this article from an address, "Les recherches historico-critiques et l'avenir de la Scolastique." This address was given at the International "Scholastic" Congress, Rome, September 10, 1950. It has been printed in Antonianum *XXVI (1951), 40-48, and the English adaptation is being published with the kind permission of the distinguished editor of that review.*

of histories of medieval philosophy, how many histories of medieval theology are to be found? As against twenty volumes on the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, how many historical expositions of his theology are there? During the past hundred years the general tendency among historians of medieval thought seems to have been to imagine the Middle Ages as peopled by philosophers rather than theologians.

There are many reasons for this fact. And first, dogmatic reasons. In a sense, it can be said that the separation of philosophy and theology goes back to the Middle Ages: St. Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas Aquinas have clearly established the distinction of their respective objects. Both have written philosophical treatises and commentaries on Aristotle, in which natural reason alone was at work. Moreover, when their disciples later on had to write such commentaries or questions on Aristotle, they naturally made use of the philosophical views which they could find scattered through the theological works of the masters. Thus, for instance, the *Quaestiones super Duodecim Libros Metaphysicae* of Antonius Andreas, an immediate disciple of Duns Scotus, constitutes in fact a sort of exposition of the metaphysics of Duns Scotus. To a lesser degree, even the questions of Duns Scotus on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* had already been something of that kind. Yet, apart from the curious group of the so-called Averroists, who do not seem to have invented much, Scholastic philosophy was always conceived, in the Middle Ages, as a preparation for theology. As a rule, a philosopher then was a future theologian; and because he was fully aware of the fact, the philosophy which he was teaching was that of his future theology. The great change took place in the seventeenth century, when Descartes decided, not at all to oppose theology—on the contrary, he felt sure his own conclusions would help Christian faith better than the Scholastic philosophers had ever done—but to philosophize as though there were no such thing as theological wisdom. In other words, Descartes felt convinced that a new metaphysics, better adapted to the new mathematical physics, should be substituted for the antiquated philosophy of the Scholastics, which rested on the antiquated physics of Aristotle. Henceforward philosophers would only know, while theologians would only believe. Philosophy would be an exclusively scientific knowledge of the world in the light of natural reason alone; theology would simply teach men how to achieve salvation through grace and in the light of revelation.

Naturally, since it was being attacked as a philosophy, Scholasticism had to counterattack as a philosophy. This movement had already begun in the sixteenth century, and it was accelerated toward the end of

the seventeenth. The great theologians of the Middle Ages were then progressively turned into so many metaphysicians.

In 1667, writing under the pseudonym of *Ambrosius Victor,* André Martin, a priest of the Oratory, devoted the five volumes of his *Philosophia Christiana* to the purpose of making St. Augustine a philosopher. In 1679 there appeared the *Philosophia juxta Thomae Dogmata* of Antoine Goudin, a work which has been followed by innumerable *Cursus Philosophiae Thomisticae* down to our own day. In 1746 J. A. Ferrari defended the philosophy of Aristotle *rationibus Joannis Duns Scoti subtilium principis.* What a long road had been covered since the Middle Ages! Duns Scotus had devoted himself to using Aristotle in order to interpret faith; in the eighteenth century his disciples were using him in order to defend Aristotle. In 1782 Carolus Josephus a Sancto Floriano published his *Joannis Duns Scoti Philosophia,* which was by no means the last of its kind. Then, as today, the aim was to oppose a philosophy to a philosophy; and that is why the theologians of the Middle Ages, who never wrote a philosophy while they were alive, have composed so many after their death.

To these dogmatic reasons may be added historical ones. The more Scholasticism became a distinct philosophical discipline, the more it became difficult for the history of philosophy to neglect the Middle Ages. If there had been philosophies of St. Augustine, of St. Albert the Great, and of St. Thomas Aquinas, no general history of philosophy could afford to ignore their existence. Furthermore, it was scarcely possible to overlook the great and evident difference that distinguishes modern philosophy in its very beginnings from Greek philosophy at its termination. Metaphysics, as it came out of the Middle Ages, was different from metaphysics as it had entered the Middle Ages. Something, historians would think, must have taken place in philosophy, and this even in the faculties of theology. That is why historians have been prompted to write so many studies which oscillate between theology and philosophy, and to treat medieval theologians as if they had been philosophers. In point of fact, these historians were doing the best they could, without being too much concerned over speculative distinctions; their job was to find medieval philosophy where it existed, and they did it.

But, understandable as all this may have been, the question may be asked whether this attitude of the historians can be considered a medieval view of the Middle Ages. Clearly, it could not. The general attitude of the great doctors of the thirteenth century appears to be faithfully defined by St. Bonaventure when he distinguishes (*In*

Hexaemeron, XI, 7) four types of writings, each with its own rank and value. There is, first, Sacred Scripture, which contains that which it is necessary for man to know in order to save himself. There are, secondly, the writings of the fathers, aiding in the interpretation of the Scripture. There are, thirdly, the commentaries on the *Sentences,* aiding in the interpretation of the fathers. There are, fourthly, the books of the philosophers aiding in the interpretations of the commentaries on the *Sentences* or of the *summas* of theology. Now there is no doubt that the testimony of St. Bonaventure must be taken with some reservation; for, particularly after 1273, he expressed his antipathy toward philosophy and the philosophers with considerable sharpness. Yet his testimony remains valid. For indeed it is a fact, as some have noted, that philosophy does not occupy the prime level of importance in the thought of St. Bonaventure; but in the thought of what theologian worthy of the name has philosophy ever occupied such a prime level? Certainly not in that of St. Thomas Aquinas. After we have introduced all the corrections that history may require, the fact remains that the hierarchical order described by St. Bonaventure does not appear to have been contested by a single medieval master of theology. There is first Scripture; there are then the fathers, as interpreters of Scripture; there are the theologians as interpreters of the fathers; there are finally the philosophers, to understand the theologians.

It was therefore natural that, for the last forty years, historians with a theological education should recall this fact for those historians whose education was primarily philosophical. Their reaction can be summarized in the criticism directed by one of them against a book on the "philosophy" of St. Bonaventure. What you call philosophy, this critic said, is nothing but a mutilated theology. He was right, and the criticism applies equally to every book dealing with the "philosophy" of St. Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, or Ockham. Let us therefore state our first conclusion. The research in medieval thought, which began by being concerned with the philosophies of the Middle Ages, is tending more and more to restore these philosophies within the theologies which contain them.

There is a second development in historical research, which is all the more remarkable since it seems to contradict our first conclusion. Some hundred years ago, historians had no difficulty in speaking of *a* Scholastic philosophy. Hauréau even tended to reduce this Scholastic philosophy to a single problem, as though everything within it were a variation on the common theme of the nature of universals. Nearer our own day, there are those who have gone so far as to hold that the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas was to such an extent the common

doctrine of his age, that one could expound it by using only the texts of his contemporaries. But in fact the progress of historical studies has led us to differentiate medieval doctrinal positions. Without denying that which is common in the Aristotelian technique of the medieval theologians, we are beginning to realize the distinctive and individual way in which each of them made use of this common technique. Every great medieval doctrinal synthesis appears to us more and more in the light of its own originality; and there is no doubt that we see these doctrines as more distinct from one another than they appeared to our predecessors.

Even the unity of the Schools now appears as less rigid than we once thought. We would no longer think of St. Albert the Great as of a man who tried to be a Thomist by anticipation, and failed; and we should experience some hesitation today in saying what our predecessors saw no reason to doubt—namely, that Giles of Rome belongs to the school of St. Thomas Aquinas. Now, in the eyes of the historian, this progressive differentiation among Scholastic theologies seems to be related to the fact that these various theologies have used various philosophical instruments. This is the point of the old scholastic maxim: *Qualis in philosophia talis in theologia.* Hence, our very effort to return to theology has placed us in the presence of as many distinct philosophies as there are distinct theologies. This fact is so important that it deserves to be examined attentively.

In a sense it accounts for the stress put by so many historians on the philosophical aspect of medieval theologies. The very nature of Scholastic theology calls for it. Since theology is an *intellectus fidei,* it is quite natural that diverse ways of achieving this understanding, within the unity of faith, should produce diverse theologies. The "philosophies" of the theologians, therefore, even after being restored within their theologies, will continue to occupy in the future an important place in the history of medieval thought. But it will not be the same place as that occupied in the past. For history has taken a decisive step. The lesson of experience is that the more the historian separates philosophy from theology in medieval doctrines, the more Scholastic philosophy tends to shrivel into a general technique that becomes increasingly poorer in originality and, in the end, identifies itself with the philosophy of Aristotle as seen by Avicenna or Averroes. It is no wonder that the historians who are the most anxious to extract from medieval texts a philosophy that is entirely free of theology are usually the same historians who insist upon the oneness of Scholastic philosophy, or at least upon the existence of a Scholastic "synthesis," of which it is possible to say that it was the common philosophy of the

thirteenth century in its entirety. And, from their own point of view, these historians are correct. Act and potency, form and matter, the fourfold division of causes, metaphysics as the science of being, truth as the grasp of being such as it is—here are so many master theses, to which others might easily be added, which define a philosophical interpretation of the world common to all our theologians. The position of the above-mentioned historians, therefore, is true. But if this were the whole truth, we should have to conclude from it that the Christian Middle Ages remained philosophically sterile and that, as some indeed still imagine, they did no more than repeat *ad nauseam* a more or less deformed Aristotle.

It is at this point that the second conclusion to be drawn from the lessons of historical research requires our attention. Experience teaches us that the more we reintegrate the philosophies of the Middle Ages within their theological context, the more their originality becomes apparent. This same fact can be expressed in many ways. For example, one may say that it is while serving theology that philosophical thought became creative; or one may say that, in the golden age of Scholasticism, the more a master was a great theologian the more he was a great philosopher. The fact itself is what is important, and the fact is this: All the decisive steps of progress made by Western philosophy in the Middle Ages were made in relation to points of doctrine, in which the *intellectus fidei* in some way evoked philosophical originality. At the same time, therefore, that historical research justifies, for the Middle Ages, the saying that *qualis in philosophia talis in theologia,* it invites us to complete it by another one: *qualis in theologia talis in philosophia,* which is neither less true nor less important. Indeed, these are two formulations of the same truth, which theologians themselves know very well. For if theology is the understanding of faith, we cannot isolate this understanding from the faith whose understanding it gives; nor can we isolate faith from the understanding which it is seeking. In brief, it is to its status as an instrument of theology itself that medieval philosophy owes its fecundity.

This lesson of history poses, in its turn, a number of doctrinal questions that the historian as such does not have the competence to resolve, but which he has a duty to ask, because their answer is not without importance for the future of Scholasticism.[1]

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[1] It should already be clear that we do not here intend to propose, in any proper sense, a definition of the word "Scholasticism." We have rather in mind a nominal definition, which is nothing more than a designation. We call "Scholasticism" the manner of theologizing and philosophizing practiced by the great masters of the thirteenth and fourteenth

If we give to the thirteenth century the title of the golden age of Scholasticism, the reason no doubt is our conviction that this was the time when Scholasticism reached its point of perfection and fully succeeded in its undertaking. And if it be true that *res eodem modo conservantur quo creantur,* it would seem that we cannot hope for such success in the future without proceeding in the same way as did the thirteenth-century Scholastics. Now history is there to tell us, at this point, how the thirteenth-century theologians did their work.

Whatever excuses may be found for it, the most serious difficulty attending our modern dissociation of Scholastic philosophy from its theology is that, by a resulting illusion of perspective, we begin to represent the work of the medieval theologians as having consisted in introducing, within a completely developed doctrine of faith, an also completely developed philosophy, which they borrowed in all its completeness from among the philosophers of their age. It is this illusion that has led to the often-repeated inference that redoing the work of the thirteenth century would consist, first of all, in our taking the philosophy and the sciences of our own age as a starting point, in order to rebuild a new Scholasticism in harmony with the modern spirit and acceptable to our contemporaries. It seems to me that this amounts to nothing less than a misreading of history. The theologians of the thirteenth century did not begin with the philosophical sciences of their age in order to adapt theology to them; they rather began with faith in order to assume these philosophical sciences within faith by transforming them in its light. Dedicated as they were to the understanding of faith, our theologians accepted without criticism a great deal of ready-made philosophical and scientific knowledge that had no necessary relation to Christian revelation—and, be it noted, these are precisely the dead and antiquated parts of their work, which we have absolutely no reason to preserve. But if nothing is more transitory than positive science, nothing is less transitory than the Christian faith; and that is why, if the Scholasticism of the thirteenth century should have to be redone, it would be necessary that faith, and not science, should have changed since the thirteenth century.

Even though it is my aim to be brief, I beg permission to stop a moment on this important point. For the illusions of perspective to which I have referred are not all on the same side. To those who request a new Scholastic theology, founded on modern philosophy,

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centuries, such as St. Albert the Great, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas Aquinas, or Duns Scotus. Even as a nominal definition, we do not propose it for currency. The point is that *that* is what we are talking about.

there are others who reply that there is only one true philosophy, which is that of Aristotle, and that it is because Scholastic theology is founded on this true philosophy that it itself is true. But neither Duns Scotus nor St. Thomas Aquinas *founded* their theologies on any philosophy, not even the philosophy of Aristotle. As theologians, they have made use of philosophy within the light of faith; and it is from this usage that philosophy has come forth transformed. What is of a metaphysical import in St. Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus is genuinely their own metaphysics. Each Aristotelian formula they take over and use receives from the notion of *esse* in St. Thomas Aquinas or from the notion of *ens infinitum* in Duns Scotus a meaning that Aristotle never knew, one that he would scarcely have understood and that only those who have inadequately penetrated it are willing to identify with the Aristotelian metaphysics of being. Consequently, to redo Scholasticism *on the basis of* Kant or of Hegel—this would be to wish to redo what had never been done. The decisive achievement of the masters of the Middle Ages was perhaps this, that, because they were theologians, they did not think *on the basis of* any science or *on the basis of* any philosophy. We are therefore interpreting history in a misleading way if we say that Scholasticism tied the Christian faith to the ancient philosophy of Aristotle, and, consequently, that we are invited by its example to do the same thing with the philosophy of our age. What Scholastic theology did was rather to create, in the human meaning of this word, a new metaphysics, whose truth, being independent of the state of science at any given historical moment, remains as permanent as the light of the faith within which it was born.

The future of Scholasticism, then, will not consist in adapting the medieval metaphysics of being and its causes to the ceaseless variations in science and philosophy; its future will rather consist in integrating to it the positive acquisitions made by science and philosophy in order to correct and purify them. To proceed otherwise would be to place Scholasticism in a situation violent to its nature. It would be both to suppress it and to lose, along with it, one of the greatest blessings that we owe to it. It is by bringing philosophy under its influence that medieval theology has liberated metaphysics from physics without enslaving it to itself. For the first time, theology severed the bonds which, even in Aristotle himself, still held first philosophy a captive on the earth of positive science; and theology did this by turning philosophy towards the heaven of faith. Metaphysics cannot lose itself in such a heaven, since it cannot reach it; but, nevertheless, it

is by tending towards this heaven of faith that metaphysics achieves its own liberty and realizes its true equilibrium. Its future success will thus depend upon its remaining true to its own nature; and this consists in remaining intimately related to the understanding of faith.

The adventures of philosophy in the seventeenth century should be a lesson for us on this point. In spite of what has been said, the evil then affecting Scholastic philosophy was not its ignorance of the new science; the evil was the illusion that the task before it was to defend the antiquated science of Aristotle against the new science. Actually, the task for Scholastic philosophy then was to locate this new science in its proper place, under the light of those very metaphysical principles whose meaning it had forgotten. Our task today is the same. It is not indeed to build up a new metaphysics and a new Scholastic theology every time positive science invents a new world. The men of our generation have been born in the scientific universe of Newton; they have reached maturity in the universe of Einstein; they are entering old age in the universe of undulatory physics and, with luck, hope to die in a fourth universe, as different from Einstein's as his was from Newton's. Is it going to be said that we should have built up three new metaphysics and three new Scholastic theologies in order to keep pace with the evolution of positive science during our own lifetime? Was not it better for them to remain unborn that to be stillborn and straightway discarded? Our task today is to recapture the true spirit of medieval metaphysics, to grasp once more the genuine and profound meaning of its principles. I should add that Scholasticism, covered over by more than five centuries of dust, is now experiencing its greatest evil—the ignorance of its own nature. To restore it to itself, let us listen to the counsel of history: Scholastic philosophy must return to theology!

In saying this, I am not in the least contesting the distinction between faith and reason. Nor am I forgetting the formal distinction of objects, so dear to the dialecticians, between theology and philosophy. I am not speaking of philosophy in general, but of that kind of philosophy which we call "Scholastic." I readily agree that, without paying attention to theology, it is possible to be a philosopher, but not a Scholastic philosopher. The hackneyed objection that to philosophize as a theologian is not to philosophize at all forgets that a formal distinction of objects is not a real separation in the order of exercise. One even wonders at times whether this real separation is not responsible for the fact that, in certain minds, the notion

of Scholastic theology, no less than that of Scholastic philosophy, has become obscured. If it were not obscured we should not have to stress the obvious fact that to exercise the human intellect within the transcendent light of faith means something else than to pretend to deduce philosophically demonstrated conclusions from an article of faith. The philosophy we call Scholastic is not distinguished from other philosophies by its essence; it is rather distinguished from them as the best way of philosophizing. That is indeed how the encyclical *Rerum Novarum* has described Scholastic philosophy, and with perfect reason: *Qui philosophiae studium cum obsequio fidei Christianae conjungunt, ii optime philosophantur.* To philosophize otherwise is assuredly to philosophize, but it is to philosophize less well. At any rate, it is no longer to philosophize as did the Scholastics. There are certain fish that live only in warm water. To say that they will die in cold water is not to deny that they are fish. As for the fish that, as some insist at all costs, must be made to live in cold water in order to maintain the purity of their essences, they do not become true fish, but dead fish.

This is precisely what happened to metaphysics when, in order to liberate it from the theology that had formerly liberated it from Aristotelian physics, Descartes made it subservient to his own physics. Hence this paradoxical result, that, in our own days, the only real defenders of metaphysics as an autonomous science are found to be the Scholastic theologians. Now, let us be careful to observe, these theologians do not hold that metaphysics is necessary to sacred doctrine. The word of God is sufficient unto itself without any metaphysics. But if you make good use of metaphysics in theology, you will get a better theology, and you also will get a better metaphysics. This at least, is what happened in the thirteenth century, and the truth of yesterday points out that of tomorrow. It is by restoring the several Scholastic philosophies to their natural places—namely, their natal theologies—that history will better and better succeed in understanding them as they were. *Non erubesco evangelium* is a saying that we must know how to pronounce in all domains, even including that of scholarship. And it also is by returning to its natural place that Scholastic philosophy can have the hope, or rather the certitude, that it will once more bring forth flowers and fruit. Only a prophet would be able to say what is to be the shape of its future. But the historian can safely state by whom Scholastic philosophy will be given a true life in the future. The true Scholastic philosophers will always be theologians.

SIGER OF BRABANT

FERNAND VAN STEENBERGHEN

What is the present state of research in Siger of Brabant? To answer this question, I propose to give first a brief account of the conclusions that seem to be definitely reached and universally accepted about the career, writings, doctrine, and historical role of Siger. Then I shall briefly indicate the points that are still unsettled or that require further investigation.

I. CONCLUSIONS REACHED

THE CAREER

We have no positive information about the place and date of Siger's birth. His name indicates that he was a native of the duchy of Brabant, which, in the thirteenth century, was a fief of the Germanic Empire. His relations with Bernier of Nivelles and John of Huy, his enrollment in the nation of the Picards (one of the four corporations of the Faculty of Arts at Paris), and finally the fact that he was canon of St. Paul at Liège, all suggest that he was born in the Walloon portion of the duchy of Brabant; that is, in that portion in which Romance dialects or dialects akin to French were spoken. As for the date of his birth, we have no reason for placing it before 1240.

Probably when Siger was about fourteen years old (for this was the custom of the time), he went to Paris to study liberal arts. He must have arrived there between 1255 and 1260, and he obtained the mastership six years later, between 1260 and 1265. We may suppose that he was then little more than twenty years of age. His name

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THE VERY REVEREND CANON FERNAND VAN STEENBERGHEN is a professor at the University of Louvain; he has been a visiting lecturer at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto. Besides his writings on Siger of Brabant, referred to in the footnotes, he has written an Ontology *and an* Epistemology, *both of which have recently been translated. He is a frequent contributor to the* Revue philosophique de Louvain *and other European journals.*

appears for the first time in the decree of August 27, 1266, by which the papal legate, Simon of Brion, put an end to the dissensions that had troubled the Faculty of Arts. His first appearance on the historical scene reveals him in the unedifying role of a young and unscrupulous leader, who was determined to impose his views on others by every means in his power.

From his very first years as a teacher, Siger professed a disquieting Aristotelianism, without regard for theology and orthodox Christian doctrine. This is clear from the *Quaestiones in Tertium de Anima,* the only work certainly anterior to 1270 that has come down to us; it is also attested by the reaction of St. Bonaventure in his *Collationes de Decem Praeceptis* (conferences given at Paris during the Lent of 1267) and in his *Collationes de Donis Spiritus Sancti* (Lent of 1268), as well as by the reaction of St. Thomas in his *opusculum De Unitate Intellectus* (1270), which was directed especially against Siger. The young master, however, was not alone in his opinions, for a notable group of masters and students shared his ideas, as is clear from texts of St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas, and other contemporary witnesses.

On December 10, 1270, the bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier, condemned a series of thirteen philosophical errors and excommunicated all who should teach them knowingly (*qui eos docuerint scienter vel asseruerint*). The errors condemned may be reduced to four chief ones: the eternity of the world, the denial of universal providence, the unicity of the intellectual soul, and psychological determinism.

We do not know what the immediate reaction of Siger was. If there was a calm, it was of short duration. Public disturbances were but the symptoms of a profound divergence of ideas on the doctrinal plane. In the face of the theologians and the orthodox members of the Faculty of Arts, who were led by Alberic of Rheims, the radical party of Siger maintained an intransigent attitude of fealty to philosophy and especially to Aristotle, who was for them its incarnation. On the other hand, within the party itself, divergences arose over the interpretation of Aristotle. Some, among them Siger, came under the influence of St. Thomas Aquinas and mitigated in some measure their heterodox position, while others, on the contrary, obstinately persisted in professing doctrines more and more audacious. Boetius of Dacia, who seems to have been the principal figure of the group after Siger, may well have belonged to the extremist wing.

On the side of the theologians and the members of the Faculty of Arts opposed to radical Aristotelianism, the struggle for the defense of orthodoxy continued after 1270.

Giles of Rome published his little tract *Errores Philosophorum* in all probability between 1270 and 1274. This document contains the witness of a contemporary as to how men then regarded the sources of the heterodox philosophical movement. Between 1272 and 1277 Giles got out another small treatise, *De Plurificatione Intellectus Possibilis,* in which he discusses the question of Averroist monopsychism. The author is visibly impressed by the arguments of the Commentator, although he gives a solid refutation of them, a refutation based principally on St. Thomas.

The minister general of the Friars Minor, St. Bonaventure, returned to Paris after the departure of St. Thomas Aquinas. During the Eastertide of 1273, in the convent of the Franciscans, he gave an important series of conferences in which he reacted vigorously against heterodox Aristotelianism and the rationalistic tendencies of certain masters of arts of Paris. These conferences, the *Collationes in Hexaemeron,* were interrupted by the elevation of St. Bonaventure to the cardinalate. They contain no philosophical refutation of the errors they denounce; they simply condemn these errors from the point of view of faith and theology.

Finally, it is without doubt about the same time—that is, between 1272 and 1277—that Giles of Lessines, a Dominican of the convent of Paris, took the initiative in consulting St. Albert the Great about the new philosophical doctrines that the partisans of Siger continued to propagate. He sent St. Albert at Cologne a list of fifteen propositions that "the most eminent masters teach in the schools of Paris" and that had already been opposed in numerous assemblies, and he begged St. Albert to give the *coup de grâce* to these ill-omened errors. Thirteen of the fifteen propositions coincide literally with the propositions condemned by the bishop of Paris in 1270, to which Giles had added two new articles, one compromising the identity of the body of Christ before and after his death, the other denying all composition in angels and the human soul. St. Albert replied with a small treatise *De Quindecim Problematibus,* a critique of the Parisian philosophers that is mordant in tone, unequal and often obscure in content, and lamentably ill-adapted to the situation. It has all the appearances of the work of an old man (St. Albert was then nearly seventy years of age) who had spent his forces and was left behind by events.

By a decree of November 23, 1276, the inquisitor of France, Simon du Val, cited before his tribunal Siger of Brabant, Goswin of La Chapelle, and Bernier of Nivelles. According to the text of the decree, the three masters had at the moment quitted the kingdom of France.

It seems that Siger appealed from the tribunal of the inquisitor to the tribunal of the pontifical Curia, which was reputed to be more clement.

Peter of Spain, who had taught logic at Paris about 1240, became pope on September 8, 1276, and took the name of John XXI. On January 18, 1277, warned of the menacing situation at Paris, he invited Stephen Tempier to make an inquiry and send him as soon as possible a report on the errors that were propagated at the University. The bishop of Paris was by no means moderation personified. He employed all his zeal in carrying out the order of the Pope and even went beyond the mission entrusted to him. On March 7, 1277, he pronounced on his own authority the condemnation of two hundred and nineteen propositions that expressed the teaching of certain masters of the Faculty of Arts, together with several doctrines taught by St. Thomas Aquinas himself (who had died three years earlier).

This resounding condemnation seems to have put an end to the professorial career of Siger. It is probable that he appeared before the tribunal of the pope and was declared innocent of the crime of heresy; but he was condemned to a kind of forced stay at the Curia, where he lived in the company of a secretary (a *clericus*). At all events, he died at Orvieto, where the Curia was established under the pontificate of Martin IV (1281-1285); the unfortunate master was stabbed by his *clericus,* who had gone mad. This tragic happening must have occurred before November 10, 1284, since it is mentioned in a letter of John Peckam, archbishop of Canterbury, bearing that date. It may be noted that Martin IV was the former papal legate Simon of Brion, who had known Siger well at Paris.

THE WRITINGS

Up to the present, fourteen certainly authentic works of Siger's have been recovered. These are either works written by the master himself or *reportationes* of his teaching. The existence of certain other writings, which are lost today, is attested to by various documents.

The works universally admitted to be authentic may be grouped in the following manner:

I. Aristotelian Commentaries. These are the most extensive works of Siger's that we possess. The *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam,* Books I to VII, is the most important work of the master; it was published in 1948 by Father Graiff. We have also the *Quaestiones in Physicam* (twenty-two questions on Book II), a *Compendium de Generatione et*

Corruptione (a brief literal commentary, unedited), and the *Quaestiones in Tertium de Anima* (seventeen questions on the intellectual soul, unedited).

II. Diverse *opuscula,* which we may class as follows:

On logic: the *Quaestiones Logicales* (three questions are announced, but the first alone is preserved; it is concerned with the signification of universal terms); the *Quaestio utrum haec sit vera: "Homo est Animal," nullo homine existente* (the question is answered, in accordance with radical Aristotelianism, by the affirmation of the eternity of the human species); the *Impossibilia* (this is the redaction of six very interesting exercises in sophistry); and finally the *Sophisma "Homo de Necessitate est Animal"* (a discussion on logical supposition).

On metaphysics: the *Quaestio de Necessitate et Contingentia Causarum* (the author tries to place the necessary and the contingent in the hierarchy of causes); and the *Quaestio de Aeternitate Mundi* (upholding the eternity of all species).

On physics: the *Quaestiones Naturales* conserved in a manuscript in Paris (two questions—one on the unicity of substantial form, the other on weight); and the *Quaestiones Naturales* conserved in a manuscript in Lisbon (six questions treating of very diverse matters).

On psychology: the *Tractatus de Anima Intellectiva* (in nine chapters Siger treats of the most debated questions touching the human intellect).

On ethics: the *Quaestiones Morales* (five small questions on themes borrowed from the treatise on the virtues).

Now a few words about the lost writings of Siger. Peter Dubois, who had been a pupil of Siger's at Paris, alludes to questions of his master on the *Politics* of Aristotle and also on the *Libri Naturales.* According to the testimony of the Italian Averroist Agostino Nifo, Siger left a treatise *De Motore Primo,* another *De Intellectu,* and finally a *Liber de Felicitate.* Nifo gives extracts from these works. Certain texts of John Baconthorp seem to indicate a commentary on the *De Anima* distinct from those we now possess. Finally, Siger himself, in the *Quaestiones Logicales,* refers to an earlier work on the nature of the universals and gives the *incipit* of it.

If we except the *Tractatus de Anima Intellectiva* and perhaps the *Compendium de Generatione,* all the writings we know are the direct result of Siger's class work. Either they are simple *reportationes* (that is, notes taken by students), or they are works drawn up with the help of *reportationes* or of notes the master had used for his course.

THE DOCTRINE

All present-day historians agree in recognizing a heterodox form of Aristotelianism in the doctrinal current personified by Siger. This heterodox Aristotelianism is the most striking and incontestable characteristic of his school.

When and how did this subversive movement of ideas begin? It has been claimed that traces of it are to be found first in the time of William of Auvergne, then in the middle of the thirteenth century, then in the first writings of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas, and finally in the *Summa contra Gentiles* of the latter. In reality, there exists no positive trace whatsoever of heterodox Aristotelianism prior to about the year 1265; and it is, moreover, improbable that a teaching so clearly opposed to the doctrine of the Church could have been given at Paris without provoking the quick reaction of the theologians and of the church authorities. It seems certain, therefore, that about the year 1265 Siger himself—and perhaps, together with him, some of his colleagues of the Faculty of Arts—inaugurated a manner of philosophizing that took no account of the exigencies of theology and of Christian faith.

This daring attitude, however, far from appearing to the eye of the historian as the unexpected breaking-off of a well-established tradition, is looked upon rather as the logical and well-nigh inevitable term of a long evolution of tendencies that had begun to manifest themselves in the Faculty of Arts ever since the beginning of the century. The arrival of the pagan philosophical literature led to the discovery of philosophy by the Latins, and especially by the masters of the Faculty of Arts. The possibility of a purely rational research and of an autonomous philosophical learning gave the career of these masters an entirely new signification and a ten-fold-increased interest. On the other hand, the exercise of a philosophical research based on the study of pagan philosophers could not but throw into relief the many differences of spirit and doctrine that placed the Christian outlook on things in opposition to the naturalism and rationalism of these pagans.

The first crisis came to a head at the beginning of the century, but was quickly overcome by the ecclesiastical interventions of 1210 and 1215. During the course of the following decades, Aristotelianism developed without any notable check; but in the philosophical literature prior to 1250 may be discerned symptoms of a state of mind that could easily become dangerous. The new statutes of 1252 and especially those of 1255 cleared the way for a rapid development of the heterodox

tendency in the heart of the Faculty of Arts, while other circumstances also seem to have favored the growth of this movement at Paris. St. Bonaventure, for instance, had to give up his teaching after 1257 to become minister general of the Franciscans; St. Albert the Great had long since gone to Germany; St. Thomas Aquinas had returned to Italy in 1259. Thus, no first-class personality remained at Paris; and for this reason the years 1260 to 1265 were propitious ones for the hatching of doctrines that were soon to cause such a violent disturbance.

We know that Siger was of a fiery temperament, impetuous and easily led to excess. We find in his works that strong and peremptory tone, that pugnacious attitude, that hatred for compromise, which the canon of Brabant manifests in the management of the affairs of his Faculty. On the other hand, Siger was gifted with undeniable intellectual abilities: he was a profound thinker, a tried logician, and an assiduous reader of the philosophers; he loved clarity and precision. The few contemporaneous testimonies that have come down to us show that, as a philosopher, he had acquired an enviable reputation. His pupil, Peter Dubois, calls him *praecellentissimus doctor philosophiae* and glories in the fact that Siger was his master; Dubois regards him as a classical author on the same footing as St. Albert the Great and St. Thomas Aquinas. A manuscript of the ancient College of the Sorbonne calls him *Sigerus Magnus,* and Dante places him in paradise in the company of the twelve sages, by the side of St. Thomas Aquinas. And his contemporary Giles of Lessines testifies in his letter to St. Albert the Great to the reputation acquired by Siger and his colleagues, *qui in philosophia maiores reputantur.*

Endowed with such a nature and with such talents, the young master from Brabant seems to have very quickly fallen before the charms of the new movement that swept through the Faculty of Arts about 1260. He gave himself body and soul to his philosophical calling and the study of the great masters. A striking characteristic of his work is its strict and exclusively rational orientation. He had a keen sense of the autonomy of every science in its own domain, and it was a point of honor with him to quote only from sources that were purely philosophical.

Curiously enough for Siger and his school, this cult of reason went hand in hand with a cult of tradition, but tradition of a certain kind. These daring spirits, who were revolutionary in their outlook and did not hesitate to overthrow ideas accepted in Christian milieus, professed a veritable cult of *philosophical* tradition. Siger's ambition was not to

be an innovator in philosophy, but to repeat and spread the teaching of the great philosophers. To philosophize was, for him, to seek out the thought of the philosophers on any subject: *quaerendo intentionem philosophorum in hoc magis quam veritatem, cum philosophice procedamus.*[1] This strange conception of philosophical research was due to the circumstances in which Western philosophy developed in the thirteenth century. Confronted all at once with the monumental work of Greco-Arabic science, the Latins had to give themselves to a very arduous work of assimilation; and so, for almost a century, practically the whole of their endeavors was taken up with this work of exegesis. In the Faculty of Arts, the master of philosophy was one whose essential task was to "read" Aristotle. St. Albert the Great himself was no stranger to this way of looking at the task of philosophy. In his paraphrases he often refuses to give his own views and is prompt to decline responsibility for the doctrines he expresses, declaring that he is performing merely the task of an exegete.[2]

We may summarize as follows the main lines of the philosophy of Siger.

Siger's philosophical system is dominated by a theory of knowledge that is strictly Aristotelian. The doctrine of the universals receives his attention many times, and he has some interesting views on scientific methodology and the critique of knowledge. He bases the absolute value of judgments of the abstract order on the eternity of the world and all the species.

With regard to the place that metaphysics should occupy in the system of sciences, Siger shows a hesitation that betrays the latent conflict between the Aristotelian and the neo-Platonist tendencies that existed side by side in his thought, as in the thought of all the Scholastics. But metaphysical principles manifestly dominate his entire synthesis, and his metaphysics fully deserves to be called "first philosophy."

There is the same fusion of Aristotelian and neo-Platonist elements in the elaboration of the science of being. The *Metaphysics* of Aristotle is the basic text. The presentation of problems, the framework, the

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[1] *De Anima Intellectiva*, VII, ed. Pierre Mandonnet, O. P., II, 164.

[2] See, for instance, the end of his commentaries on the *Metaphysics* and on the *Politics* (ed. Borgnet, VI, 751-52; VIII, 803). St. Thomas Aquinas reacted against this way of conceiving philosophical research: "Studium philosophiae non est ad hoc quod sciatur quid *homines* senserint, sed qualiter se habeat veritas rerum" (*In de Caelo*, I, lect. 22).

vocabulary, the axioms, and the theses furnished by this work constitute, therefore, the primary materials for the metaphysics of Siger. But in no other branch of philosophy did the disciples of the Philosopher, even the most fervent, depart further from the letter of Peripateticism or more modify its spirit. Sometimes consciously and sometimes unconsciously the medieval commentators of the *Metaphysics* gave the ontology of Aristotle a neo-Platonic completion, and this is what we find also in the works of Siger.

The main theses of his metaphysics are the following. The principle of all things is the First Being, absolute, eternal, personal, whose existence can be established in different ways. Siger is preoccupied with the problem of the unicity of God, which he solves by way of the doctrine of analogy and participation. The immediate effect of God is unique, necessary, and eternal; it is the first of the separated (that is, immaterial) Intelligences. From this emanate the other Intelligences, the celestial spheres and all the movements of the heavens, and then the world of generation and corruption, all according to a law of eternal necessity. The universe, therefore, proceeds wholly from God, but by a progressive emanation. Creative causality and divine government are communicated step by step and are exercised through intermediaries that become more and more numerous with their ever-increasing distance from the First Source of being. Creatures are not distinguished from God by a composition of essence and existence, but by their *potentia ad esse* (this means that, of themselves, they are merely *capable* of existing) and by their analogical and limited participation in the perfection of the First Being. The separated Intelligences are eternal beings, simple, spiritual, unique in their species, movers of the celestial spheres. The last two are the Active Intellect and the Receptive (or Possible) Intellect of humanity.

In psychology, Siger found himself confronted with problems about the nature of the human intellect that Aristotle left unsolved. At the beginning of his career, Siger thought that remaining faithful to the principles of Aristotle and the logic of Peripateticism involved adopting an interpretation similar to that of Averroes: the human individual is a substance composed of matter and a vegetative-sensitive form; but this superior animal is capable of very intimate relations with the Intellectual Soul of the human species, which is a unique spiritual substance, composed of two elements, the Active Intellect and the Possible Intellect. The Active Intellect is the active principle of our abstractive thought; the Possible Intellect, its subject. Their activity, since it is exercised in us and by means of our images (*phan-*

tasmata), merits to be called ours and differs in each individual. The will (which pertains in a similar fashion to the unique Intellectual Soul and to individuals) is a passive power, actuated by the motives presented to it by the Intellect (here Siger borders on psychological determinism). Since human individuals are wholly perishable, only the Intellectual Soul is immortal; there are no individual sanctions in a future life, but sanctions are immanent in acts themselves, good or bad, and are realized in the present life.

After 1270, under the influence of the *De Unitate Intellectus* of St. Thomas Aquinas, and probably also under the influence of the condemnation of Tempier, Siger modified his position in psychology. In his first reply to St. Thomas, written perhaps before the condemnation, he tried to remain faithful to monopsychism, at the same time answering the objections raised by the *De Unitate Intellectus*. Later, in the *De Anima Intellectiva*, his hesitations became more pronounced; he saw insurmountable difficulties against monopsychism; and he finally adhered to the teachings of the Christian faith.

HISTORICAL ROLE

Contemporary of St. Albert the Great, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas Aquinas, leader of the radical Aristotelians, Siger of Brabant is evidently one of the dominant figures of the thirteenth century. His attitude as a thinker and his doctrinal positions certainly explain many of the reactions of his contemporaries. A knowledge of Siger is indispensable, therefore, if one wishes to fully understand St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and, in general, the thinkers who lived during the last part of the thirteenth century. His historical role was important precisely by reason of the reactions he provoked in all the university milieus in Paris.

Siger appears in history as the promoter and defender of philosophy acknowledged and accepted as an autonomous discipline. It is in this role that he took a place in the *Divine Comedy* among the twelve sages who reside in the heaven of light. When Dante and Beatrice arrive at the fourth heaven, that of the sun or light, they find themselves in the presence of a brilliant company of twelve illustrious souls: St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Albert the Great, Gratian (the great canonist), Peter Lombard, Solomon, Dionysius the Areopagite, Orosius (a disciple of St. Augustine, a historian of paganism, and a Christian apologist), Boethius, St. Isidore of Seville, St. Bede the Venerable (three great educators of the West), Richard of Saint Victor, and Siger. St. Thomas, who presides over this glorious circle, makes the introductions.

Coming to Siger, his immediate neighbor on his left, he says to Dante:

> "This, whence to me returneth thy regard,
> The light is of a spirit unto whom
> In his grave meditations death seemed slow.
> It is the light eternal of Sigier,
> Who, reading lectures in the Street of Straw,
> Did syllogize invidious verities."[3]

These mysterious lines have, all down the centuries, exercised the ingenuity of Dante scholars, and the most curious hypotheses have been put forth. Today it is possible to give a quite satisfactory explanation of Dante's verses.

Dante was convinced that many conflicts arise in this world from the fact that people do not stay within the limits of their job. He was, for example, a fervent partisan of a separation between church and state, between theology and philosophy. The twelve souls who abide in the heaven of light are all men who have glorified God by fidelity to their personal calling. Dante had to find someone who could be a personification of philosophy and who was also a Christian (for he puts no pagan in the heaven of the *Divine Comedy*). Siger of Brabant was his man just because he had fought all his life long for the autonomy of philosophy.

But was not Siger a heretic, combatted by St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas, condemned by the bishop of Paris and the pope? How could Dante place him in heaven? This objection gives us the opportunity of stating more precisely Siger's attitude toward the faith. Before the first condemnation (1270), he expounds his philosophical convictions without being anxious about the teaching of faith or theology. After 1270, he becomes disturbed, since the bishop and the theologians have made him conscious of some antinomies between his philosophical thought and Christian teaching. When he defends a heterodox doctrine, he makes a twofold declaration. According to his role as a philosopher, he only expounds the opinions of Aristotle and of the other philosophers; these opinions are false as far as they contradict the teaching of revelation, which is absolutely true and above every human opinion. So he never tries to escape the difficulty by professing the famous doctrine of the "double truth" (one according to reason and the other according to revelation, although contradictory to the first). On the contrary, he tries to explain the divergences that appear between philosophical conclusions and revealed truth. One must confess that he never came to a quite satisfactory conciliation; but all

[3] *Paradise*, X, 133-38 (Longfellow's translation).

historians today agree in admitting that he has always been a sincere believer and that he never was a disguised rationalist, as Mandonnet formerly thought.

Dante, who wrote about twenty years after Siger's death, probably saw the events as follows. Siger had been at one time, it is true, the adversary of St. Thomas Aquinas and had taught a few dangerous doctrines; but from 1270 onward he had made sincere efforts to avoid heterodoxy and had often professed to be attached to the Catholic faith. From the viewpoint of Dante, the great condemnation of 1277 (which had been criticized at Paris, too, by outstanding theologians such as Godfrey of Fontaines) was the fruit of an envious reaction of the conservative theologians (among whom was the bishop himself, Stephen Tempier) against Aristotelianism. St. Thomas Aquinas had been a victim of the reaction together with Siger. Thus the Brabantine master had become something like a "martyr" of Aristotelianism and autonomous philosophy. The pope had not condemned him as a heretic, but the hostility of the theologians had led him to a painful exile and a tragic death. In the light of these data, the verses of Dante are easy to understand: St. Thomas Aquinas does homage to his former colleague of Paris, who had been, just like himself, the victim of his fidelity to Aristotle and to philosophy. The "Street of Straw" was a street in the Latin quarter of Paris in which the schools of the liberal arts were situated; there master Siger had "syllogized" truths that had provoked the envy of the theologians.[4]

II. PROBLEMS TO BE RESOLVED

Obscurity still hangs over some of the aspects of the life, literary activity, and thought of our philosopher. It is easy to indicate the directions that research must take.

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[4]For the study of Siger of Brabant, the great work of Pierre Mandonnet, O. P., still remains fundamental: *Siger de Brabant et l'averroïsme latin au XIIIe siècle* (2d edition, 2 vols., "Les Philosophes Belges," VI-VII; Louvain: 1911, 1908). This has to be completed and corrected, however, by Fernand Van Steenberghen's *Siger de Brabant d'après ses oeuvres inédites* (2 vols., "Les Philosophes Belges," XII-XIII; Louvain: 1931, 1942). See also Bruno Nardi, *Sigieri di Brabante nel pensiero del Rinascimento Italiano* (Rome, 1945); Anneliese Maier, "Nouvelles questions de Siger de Brabant sur la *Physique* d'Aristote," *Revue philosophique de Louvain,* XLIV (1946), 497-513; Fernand Van Steenberghen, "Le *De Quindecim problematibus* d'Albert le Grand," *Mélanges Auguste Pelzer* (Louvain, 1947), pp. 415-39; A. Dondaine, "Le manuel de l'Inquisiteur (1230-1330)," *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum,* XVII (1947), 85-194 (on Siger, pp. 186-92); Andrea-Cornelio, *Siger de Brabant: Questions*

In the first place, it is necessary to continue the publication of texts. For a long time now we have been waiting for Monsignor Auguste Pelzer's edition of the capital text of the *Quaestiones in Tertium de Anima*. There should be an edition of the *Quaestiones in Physicam* discovered by Miss A. Maier; the *Compendium de Generatione* is less important. Finally, there is need for a re-edition of the *opuscula* already edited by Father Mandonnet, for his edition is very defective.

In the second place, the writings of Siger need to be studied more closely, especially his master work, the *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, now available in the excellent edition of Father Graiff. We must determine exactly what the doctrine is; we must compare it with that of his contemporaries; and we must try to determine the sources, proximate or remote, that have inspired the author.

These remarks recall another problem which has not yet been solved. Who were the masters of Siger and what was their teaching? A detailed knowledge of the life of the Faculty of Arts between 1250 and 1265, and of the personality and works of the masters who initiated into philosophy Siger of Brabant, Boetius of Dacia, Bernier of Nivelles, and the other partisans of heterodox Aristotelianism, would throw great light on the immediate origin of this movement. Unfortunately the information is almost nothing, if we except the work of Nicholas of Paris (who could have been the professor of logic under whom Siger studied, since he was still teaching in 1263). The manuscripts keep their secrets as regards studies in natural philosophy, though a treatise *De Principiis Naturae*, written by John of Sicca Villa, master of arts and rector of the Faculty in 1256, has been noted.

Moreover, the influence of Siger's writings upon later Scholastic writings has not been entirely elucidated, though something has been done in this field. Father Chossat formerly uncovered interesting traces of Siger's influence in the Parisian milieu (Jean de Jandum and John Baconthorp). More recently M. Bruno Nardi has undertaken very fruitful research in the Italian milieu. It is possible that work of this nature has more agreeable surprises in store for us. It is also

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sur la Métaphysique ("Philosophes médiévaux," I; Louvain, 1948); Armand Maurer, "*Ms* Cambrai 486: Another Redaction of the Metaphysics of Siger of Brabant?," *Mediaeval Studies*, XI (1949), 224-32; "Siger of Brabant and an Averroistic Commentary on the *Metaphysics* in Cambridge, Peterhouse *Ms* 152," *Mediaeval Studies*, XII (1950), 233-35; Fernand Van Steenberghen, "Siger de Brabant," in Aimé Forest, Fernand Van Steenberghen, and Maurice de Gandillac's *Le mouvement doctrinal du IX^e au XIV^e siècle*, Vol. XIII of *Histoire de l'Église depuis les origines jusqu'à nos jours* (Paris, 1951), pp. 265-85.

probable that the inventory of manuscript treasures (still so poorly known in many cases) will reveal new writings of Siger and new copies of writings already known.

There remain two principal points on which an important disagreement still exists among historians.

The first concerns the authenticity of some commentaries on Aristotle. Let us recall the *status quaestionis.* In the manuscript of Munich in which the *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* is contained, this commentary is preceded by a collection of seven other Aristotelian commentaries: two on the *Physics,* one on the *Meteorologia,* on the *De Generatione,* on the *De Anima,* on the *De Somno et Vigilia,* and on the *De Iuventute et Senectute.* The volume has a table of contents written in the handwriting of the student who copied into his notebook the greater part of the commentaries we have just enumerated and who added other documents to his collection. In this table, drawn up with remarkable precision, the enumeration of the above-mentioned commentaries is followed by this phrase: *Item, questiones super primum, secundum, tertium, quartum et partim super quintum metaphisicorum a magistro Sigero.* The question is whether the words "by Master Siger" refer only to the commentary on the *Metaphysics* (this is the opinion of Nardi and Gilson) or to the complete collection (this was the opinion of Grabmann, which I also hold and which is accepted by the majority of historians up to the present).

Monsignor Grabmann based his opinion principally on internal criteria; and after having examined all the commentaries, he concluded that they were "undoubtedly authentic works of Siger of Brabant." To these reasons of internal criticism, I have added an argument based on an examination of the table of contents of the Munich manuscript. But the adversaries of authenticity also based themselves on internal criteria, especially on the doctrine of the *Quaestiones in Libros Tres de Anima,* which I edited in 1931; they also argue from the silence of contemporaries and successors of Siger about his "conversion to Thomism."

What are we to think of this divergence of views? I believe, in the present state of the sources, that it is impossible to answer the question definitively. The argument drawn from the table of contents does not have the strictness of a mathematical demonstration. As to the argument from silence brought against the authenticity of the commentary on the *De Anima,* two observations are to be made. First, this commentary in no way implies a "conversion to Thomism" (as certain Italian Danteans have too readily asserted), but simply the abandon-

ment (a hesitant one) of the Averroistic monopsychism. Siger could well have made the step of abandoning that doctrine, a step for which the way had already been prepared in the *De Anima Intellectiva,* without provoking sensational reactions in Paris. Moreover, all the texts published by M. Nardi (as well as by Father Chossat) show clearly that the data on the person, the career, and the condemnation of Siger had rapidly disappeared after 1277. He is not known, beginning with the fourteenth century, except by some small treatises put into circulation in the neighborhood of 1270. His very name is deformed, and curious historical mistakes are made. We should therefore not be surprised if the modification of Siger's theses in his *oral* teaching shortly before 1277 should have left no traces in the Averroists of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Finally, the arguments drawn from internal criteria, whether in favor of or against authenticity, are always open to discussion. The certainly authentic writings show a great instability in the thought of the young Brabantine master. He easily changes his views; he seems to be very susceptible to the influence of his reading and the criticism leveled against him. Miss Maier notes judiciously with regard to the problem of weight:

> The mere fact that Siger has hesitated and has not ceased to seek for new nuances for his doctrine, is already of great interest. For this fact makes it highly probable that finally, not satisfied with the primitive Averroistic doctrine, and weary of ceaseless search for new modifications, he abandoned it, and following the example of most of his contemporaries, rallied to the Aristotelian thesis.[5]

Another example: Father Armand Maurer has recently called attention to a doctrinal diversity between the *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* of Siger and the *Quaestiones in Physicam* published under Siger's name by M. Delhaye.[6] But it can be shown that the divergence is more apparent than real and that there is a striking parallel between the

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[5] "Le seul fait que Siger a hésité et qu'il n'a cessé de chercher d'autres nuances à sa doctrine, est déjà d'un grand intérêt, car il rend tout à fait vraisemblable que finalement, non satisfait de la doctrine averroïste primitive, et las de chercher sans cesse de nouvelles modifications, il l'ait complètement abandonnée et que, à l'exemple de la plupart de ses contemporains, il se soit rallié à la thèse aristotélicienne" (Anneliese Maier, "Les commentaires sur la *Physique* d'Aristote attribués à Siger de Brabant," *Revue philosophique de Louvain,* XLVII [1949], 350).

[6] Armand Maurer, C. S. B., "Esse and essentia in the Metaphysics of Siger of Brabant," *Mediaeval Studies,* VIII (1946), p. 85, n. 62.

particular question on the *Physics* and many certainly authentic writings of Siger (*Impossibilia, I; De Anima Intellectiva, V; Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* I, 7, and III, 8).[7]

The second point on which the accord of historians is not yet fully reached is the precise nature of the heterodox Aristotelianism of which Siger of Brabant was the leader. When Ernest Renan undertook to write the history of Averroism throughout the centuries, he found no difficulty in discovering Latin Averroists from the fourteenth century on. For the thirteenth century, though, the matter was far more difficult. All that he could establish was that, during the second part of the century, certain Parisian masters taught the Averroist doctrine of the unicity of the human intellect and that Siger belonged to that group. But he did not prove that the whole philosophy of Siger was Averroism. Pierre Mandonnet possessed a sufficient series of writings to determine the sources and the orientation of thought of the Brabantine master; but, curious to say, misled by Renan, he never made any direct use of them. Though he had himself published the little treatise of Giles of Rome, *Errores Philosophorum,* in which the errors peculiar to each of the pagan philosophers are clearly distinguished, he took for granted that the philosophy of Siger is "Latin Averroism" or "Averroist Aristotelianism."

In my opinion, an examination of Siger's writings leads to the following conclusions: The capital source of Siger is *Aristotle;* his philosophy is, and proposes to be above all, a renaissance of Aristotelianism. Besides this principal source, we can discern Proclus, Avicenna, Averroes, St. Albert the Great, and St. Thomas Aquinas as secondary sources. The three first represent especially the neo-Platonist influence on the thought of Siger; the two last, the Christian influence. To speak of a "Latin Averroism" in order to characterize Siger's philosophy is to contradict the data of history and give a false idea of the philosophical movement of the thirteenth century. Siger's system must be called a *radical* or *heterodox Aristotelianism.*

This reaction against Mandonnet's view, which had become classic many years ago, could not but provoke some resistances among the

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[7] On the question of the authenticity of the Aristotelian commentaries, see Van Steenberghen, *Siger de Brabant,* pp. 515-27; Etienne Gilson, *Bulletin Thomiste,* 1940-42, VI (1945), pp. 15-18; Simon Brounts, O. P., "Siger van Brabant en de wijsgeerige stroomingen aan de Parijssche Universiteit in de XIIIe Eeuw," *Tijdschrift voor Philosophie,* 1946, pp. 334-36; Nardi, *Sigieri di Brabante,* and "Note per una storia dell' averroismo latino," *Rivista di Storia della Filosofia,* 1947 and following.

many scholars who were accustomed to think according to the framework provided by Mandonnet. I was not surprised, therefore, to see some attempts to maintain his position; but these attempts could only strengthen my own conviction. I have already had the opportunity to answer my opponents and refute their arguments. I hope to do this in a more detailed and a more complete way on a future occasion.[8]

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[8] On the question of the nature of the heterodox Aristotelianism, see Van Steenberghen, *Siger de Brabant*, pp. 490-97 and 670-77; Gilson, *Bulletin Thomiste*, pp. 18-22; Brounts, *Siger van Brabant*, pp. 345-48.

THE ABSOLUTE OF HUMAN REASON IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF AUROBINDO

PAUL COLAÇO, S.J.

The fundamental questions that philosophy is called upon to answer are, Is there a God? and What is his nature? Not until these questions are answered, and answered properly, is man any nearer to the solution of the most pressing problems of his life: the problem of his finite origin, the problem of his moral conscience, the problem of his insatiable craving for a life beyond. Once the true God is found, all things fall into their right places and all human problems resolve themselves neatly and naturally.

The Vedantin expects no answers to these fundamental questions on a rational basis. For him there is no reasoning to, or arriving at, a conclusion in matters concerning God. The existence of God and his nature are declared to him by the Vedas; and the Vedas, being revealed truths,[1] carry with them their own authoritativeness and justification. Hence a Vedantin does not attach much importance to reason as a means of religious or philosophical knowledge. Once the sense of a scriptural text has been ascertained, reason can enter as a helpful auxiliary to elucidate the obscurities of faith or clarify doubts or substantiate the truth with facts of experience. And there its role ends. Reason should on no account contradict or deny or call into doubt what is contained in, and taught by, scripture, even if such teachings should appear to it as opposed to the canons of logic.

This is the second article in a series of studies on the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo Ghose. The first article, "Sri Aurobindo—A Philosopher of Reconciliation," appeared in THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, *XXVIII (May, 1951), 291-300.*

[1]Though the Hindus often use the words "revelation" and "inspiration" in connection with the origin of the Vedas, the inspirational theory of the Vedas was a later formulation and not accounted for by the Vedas themselves, according to Max Müller and Barth. For example, Radakrishnan writes in his *Indian Philosophy* (I, 128): "The Rishi of the Vedic hymns calls himself, not so much the composer of the hymns, as the seer of them. . . . The words 'dristi' and 'sruti' which are the Vedic expressions, point out how the Vedic knowledge is not a matter of logical demonstration, but an intuitive insight. Accordng to the Vedic seers, the contents of the hymns are inspired and revealed only in this sense."

This is the standpoint of a Vedantin. We have the great Sankara's word for it based on the Upanishads.[2] In his commentary on the Vedanta Sutras he writes:

> Brahman, as being devoid of form and so on, cannot become an object of perception. . . . Inference also and the other means of proof do not apply to it; but, like religious duty, it is to be known solely on the ground of holy tradition. . . . It has been maintained above that the scriptural passage enjoining thought [on Brahman, in addition to mere hearing of the sacred texts treating of Brahman] shows that the passage must not deceitfully be taken as enjoining bare independent ratiocination, but must be understood to represent reasoning as a subordinate auxiliary of intuitional knowledge.[3]

Ramanuja is even more emphatic.

> Wherever there is a conflict between cognitions based on two different means of knowledge [he notes in his Bhashya], we assign the position of the "sublated one" [refuted one] to that which admits of being accounted for in some other way. . . . Now, apprehension of Brahman—which is mere intelligence, eternal, pure, free, self-luminous—is effected by scripture which rests on endless unbroken tradition and cannot therefore be nonauthoritative; the state of bondage, on the other hand, with its manifold distinctions is proved by Perception, Inference, and so on, which are capable of imperfections and therefore may be nonauthoritative.[4]

And this nonauthoritativeness of rational knowledge is not limited only to the nature of God, but also to his existence. For, after showing how every form of knowledge is imperfect, Ramanuja adds: "The conclusion from all these is that, apart from scripture, the existence of a Lord does not admit of proof."[5]

REASON AND THE EXISTENCE OF THE ABSOLUTE ACCORDING TO AUROBINDO

The position which Aurobindo takes on the existence of God is very much opposed to the general attitude of orthodox Vedantins. These, as

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[2]For instance, Kathaka Upanishad, I, 2. 9: "That doctrine is not to be obtained by argument, but when it is declared by another, then, O dearest! it is easy to understand."

[3]Shankara Bhashya, II. 1. 6 (*Sacred Books of the East,* ed. Max Müller, XXXIV, 307).

[4]Ramanuja Bhashya, I. 1. 1 (*ibid.,* XLVIII, 24).

[5]*Ibid.,* 3 (p. 165).

we have seen, depreciate reason as a means of knowing God and entirely subordinate it to faith in all matters pertaining to God. But Aurobindo is not so radical in his attitude towards reason. He agrees with the Vedantins that "reason is not the supreme light,"[6] that its "starting-point is Ignorance . . . [and its] passage is through crooked ways of error,"[7] that it does not give us "the touch of things"[8] but "only images or representations or abstract expressions of truth,"[9] and so on. But this, in his opinion, is not sufficient reason for denying to human intelligence the minimum that is its natural due. "Mind," he affirms with insistence, "has a power also for truth. . . . If its starting-point is Ignorance, etc., still its goal is always knowledge; there is in it an impulse for truth-seeking, a power of truth-finding and truth creation."[10]

It is not, however, any kind of reason that will help us arrive at the conception and knowledge of a divine existence. Aurobindo tells us that the methods of Vedantic knowledge imply a triple kind of reason —*mixed reason* which "concerns itself only with the study of phenomena, that is to say, with the appearances of things in their relations, processes and utilities";[11] *pure reason* which, "accepting our sensible experiences as a starting-point but refusing to be limited by them goes behind, judges, works in its own right and strives to arrive at general and unalterable concepts which attach themselves not to the appearances of things, but to that which stands behind the appearances. . . . The complete use of pure reason brings us finally from physical to metaphysical knowledge";[12] and *total understanding reason or intelligence,* whose important function is "to correct the errors of sense-mind"[13] and "to investigate their truth."[14]

Applying this theory of knowledge to God, Aurobindo tells us that the senses and the sense-mind confine themselves to the world of appearances and hence are "incapable of knowing what is, they only know what appears to be, they have no plummet by which they can sound the depths of being, they can only survey the field of becoming."[15] And since all they tell is form and movement,"the senses and

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[6] *Evolution* (3rd ed.; Calcutta: Arya Pub. House, 1933), p. 31.
[7] *The Life Divine* (Calcutta: Arya Pub. House, 1939-40), II, Part I, 307.
[8] *Ibid.*, 204.
[9] *Ibid.*, 307.
[10] *Ibid.*
[11] *Ibid.*, I, 92.
[12] *Ibid.*
[13] *Ibid.*, 93.
[14] *Ibid.*, II, Part I, 204.
[15] *Ibid.*, I, 92.

the sense-mind know nothing whatever about any pure and absolute existence'';[16] it is simply beyond their range.[17]

Since pure reason is a faculty which forms ''unalterable concepts and brings us from physical to metaphysical knowledge,''[18] and since it is helped by the total understanding intelligence which investigates and corrects any error that might possibly enter into the reading of the ''sense document,''[19] Aurobindo believes that ''Mind is a reflective mirror which receives presentations or images of a preexistent Truth or Fact, either external to or at least vaster than itself,''[20] and therefore the ''concepts and the percepts of the mind . . . are indeed rays of the Truth.''[21]

He goes much further. Human mind according to him not only *can* know the existence of an Absolute but even *must* know it. ''The need of positing an infinite,'' he remarks, ''is imperatively demanded by our mind.''[22] Man cannot help arriving at the notion of a supreme reality, because to arrive at some mental conception about God and ourselves and the world is an object of the intellect;[23] nay more, ''in the principle of reason itself there is the assertion of a transcendence. For reason is in its whole aim and essence the pursuit of Knowledge, the pursuit, that is to say, of Truth by the elimination of error.''[24]

And how does this transcendental need of the mind for the Absolute come? Aurobindo answers: ''Man as he is, is not sufficient to himself'';[25] he is keenly conscious within himself of his relativity and infinitesimality, conscious that he is not ''the Eternal and the All.''[26] Consequently, he cannot help seeing that ''by himself he cannot be the explanation of the cosmos.''[27] Not only, says Aurobindo, is man an insufficient explanation of himself or of the world, but, if he observes attentively the world outside him and the continuous movement in which it is, he is forced to admit that either it is all a play of unseen material forces or there is a God. The first of the suppositions he turns down on the score that ''there is too much that [man] finds both in the

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[16]*Ibid.*, 101.
[17]*Ibid.*, 15.
[18]*Ibid.*, 92.
[19]*Ibid.*, II, Part I, 355.
[20]*Ibid.*, I, 179.
[21]*Isha Upanishad* (2nd ed.; Calcutta: Arya Pub. House, 1924), p. 95.
[22]*The Life Divine*, II, Part II, 4.
[23]*Ibid.*, 595.
[24]*Ibid.*, 85.
[25]*Ibid.*, II, Part II, 600.
[26]*Ibid.*
[27]*Ibid.*

world and in himself which is beyond them [material forces]."[28] The materialistic formula, he tells us, "serves no purpose but to put off by a vague concession the inexorable demands of Thought or to stand as an excuse for refusing to extend the limits of enquiry."[29]

Nor, according to him, is an atheistic formula any better. He contends that any human being enjoying the full use of reason cannot maintain that there is no God. All agnosticism, in his opinion, "is subject to this objection that it may be nothing but our refusal to know."[30] However much man may deny the existence of God, he adds,

> behind all these denials, we see the same constant necessity of his attempts at knowledge, for he feels the need of arriving at a unity . . . the denial of God is a denial of his true quest and his own supreme Ultimate. . . . It cannot be the final Veda. . . . It cannot be the last word of knowledge.[31]

If, therefore, materialistic and atheistic doctrines are at best an excuse to extend the limits of rational inquiry, Aurobindo concludes from the contingency of man in himself and the world outside him that there must be

> something greater than ourselves, greater than the cosmos which we live in, the supreme reality of that transcendent Being which we call God, something without which all that we see or are conscious of as existing, could not have been, could not for a moment remain in existence. Indian thought calls it Brahman, European thought, the Absolute, because it is a self-existent which is absolved of all bondage to relativities. For all relatives can only exist by something which is the truth of them all and the source and continent of their powers and properties and yet exceeds them all . . . We see by reason that such an Absolute must exist.[32]

This language is surely not of the kind we meet in the writings of any of the authoritative Vedantins. How far it is opposed to that of a traditional Vedantin can be gathered from the following typical argument for the existence of God given by Sankara. Against those who place a Non-being at the origin of things, he argues:

> The passage 'Non-being indeed was this in the beginning' [Taittiriya Upanishad, II. 7] does not declare that the cause of the world is the absolutely Non-existent. . . .

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[28] *Ibid.*, 601.
[29] *Ibid.*, I, 10.
[30] *Ibid.*, II, Part I, 416.
[31] *Ibid.*, Part II, 600.
[32] *Ibid.*, Part I, 124.

> For in the preceding sections of the Upanishad Brahman is distinctly denied to be the Non-existing, and is defined to be that which is. . . . If here the term 'Non-being' denoted the absolutely non-existent, the whole context would be broken. . . . We have therefore to conclude that, while the term 'Being' ordinarily denotes that which is differentiated by names and forms, the term 'Non-being' denotes the same substance previous to its differentiation i.e. that Brahman is, in a secondary sense of the word, called Non-being.[33]

This mode of arguing, where reason plays the role of an exegete rather than an arguer is very different from statements of Aurobindo like "he *feels* there *must be* an infinite," "his thought *needs* an Absolute," "that [Atheism] *cannot be* the final Veda," "our reason *tells us* . . . that the one pure and absolute Existence exists," and so on. Aurobindo's statements clearly imply that he admits the existence of an Absolute as a necessity imposed on us by our very reflection on the insufficiency and relativity of our own selves and of the cosmos in which we live. And what is more, we find that in all his proofs for the existence of God he does not base himself on purely scriptural authority or even intuition, but on the self-validity of reason; it is the "must be" of reason he insists upon rather than the "ought to be" of faith.

REASON AND THE NATURE OF THE ABSOLUTE ACCORDING TO AUROBINDO

As far as Aurobindo's proofs for the existence of God go, there is nothing in them that a reasonable man can object to. In fact, there is much in common between his mode of argumentation and, for instance, St. Thomas's proofs for the existence of God from the grades of perfection in the world and the contingency of creatures.[34] Yet

[33] *Sacred Books of the East*, XXXIV, 266-7.

[34] *Summa Theologiae*, I. 2. 3, proofs 3 and 4. The fourth proof reads as follows: "The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble, and the like. But 'more' and 'less' are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest, and, consequently, something which is uttermost being. . . . Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus, as fire, which is the maximum of heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God."

what is most surprising is that, after being so insistent and categorical in upholding the validity of reason for knowing the existence of the Absolute, when he comes to apply reason to investigating the nature of the Absolute, he is as loud as any Vedantin decrying reason as a hopelessly inadequate and unapt instrument of knowledge. "Mind," he tells us, "bears the stamp of incapacity and ignorance."[35] Again, "intellect is incapable of knowing the supreme Truth; it can only range about seeking for Truth, and catching fragmentary representations of it, not the thing itself."[36] Yet again, "mind is not a faculty of knowledge. . . . It is a faculty for the seeking of knowledge . . . it is that which does not know, which tries to know and never knows except as in a glass darkly."[37]

And why this incapacity of reason for knowing the nature of the Absolute? Aurobindo assigns two reasons for it: the indirectness of human knowledge, and its essential limitation and imperfection.

The indirectness of our knowledge he attributes to the fact that man's mind is hampered by its encasement in the obscurity of this life and body[38] and is therefore "conditioned . . . by the body . . . and the limitation of the nerve-system."[39] Hence our mind is forced to rely entirely on the body to make contact with the world of realities; it cannot directly get hold of them, cannot directly act upon them; whatever knowledge it obtains, it obtains through "the gates of the senses."[40]

On account of this indirect means of cognition, our mental knowledge, Aurobindo remarks, is, first, *objective;* that is to say, "knowledge represents itself as a truth seen from outside, thrown on us from an object, or as a response to its touch on the sense, a perceptive reproduction of its objective actuality."[41] It is, next, as a consequence, *separative;* that is to say, "there is on the surface a complete separateness, a division into self and not-self."[42] "We do not identify ourselves with external objects, not even with other men though they are beings of our own nature."[43] And finally, owing to this objectivity

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[35] *Life Divine*, II, Part II, 535.
[36] *The Riddle of the World* (1st ed.; Calcutta: Arya Pub. House, 1933) p. 23.
[37] *Life Divine*, I, 178.
[38] *Ibid.*, II, Part I, 358-59.
[39] *Ibid.*, 404.
[40] *Ibid.*, II, Part I, 359.
[41] *Ibid.*, 374.
[42] *Ibid.*, 388.
[43] *Ibid.*, 355.

and separativeness, it is also *superficial*: our mind never succeeds in getting "the inner or intimate touch of the thing itself,"[44] and therefore its knowledge of things is "mainly a knowledge of the surface of things."[45] And since, in his opinion, the evidence of the senses "is always by itself imperfect, not altogether reliable, and certainly not final because it is incomplete and constantly subject to error,"[46] he concludes that "the indirect basis of the mind's operation afflicts knowledge with a fundamental incertitude."[47]

Over and above the indirectness of human cognition, there is, Aurobindo maintains, a yet greater impediment to the mind's knowing the nature of God or, as a matter of fact, the nature of any reality—its inherent ignorance. "The instrument of an ignorance,"[48] "a power of ignorance,"[49] "the matrix of an Ignorance,"[50] are some of the terms he uses when referring to the mind.

And this ignorance of the mind is not an accidental thing, due, for instance, to lack of proper observation or defective perception or precipitate judgment: "the very nature of mind is ignorance,"[51] "the crux of ignorance is the constitutional, the present predominant principle of our nature."[52]

Since ignorance and separativeness are the innate character of our mind, Aurobindo tells us that "mind in its essence is a consciousness which measures, limits, cuts out forms of things from the indivisible whole, and contains them as if each were a separate integer."[53] He grants that to know "by analysis and division . . . and assemblage"[54] is not total nescience, that it is knowledge as far as it goes; but it is, he remarks, essentially "incomplete and relative,"[55] "a broken seeking and striving,"[56] "faint glimpses of His being conveyed through many varied symbols."[57]

And what is more, he is ready even to grant that all our affirmations

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[44]*Ibid.*
[45]*Ibid.*, 359.
[46]*Ibid.*
[47]*Ibid.*, 388.
[48]*Ibid.*, 53.
[49]*Ibid.*, I, 415.
[50]*Ibid.*, II, Part I, 304.
[51]*Ibid.*, 319.
[52]*Ibid.*, II, Part II, 661.
[53]*Ibid.*, I, 247.
[54]*Ibid.*, 106.
[55]*Ibid.*, II, Part I, 51.
[56]*Essays on the Gita*, First Series (3rd ed.; Calcutta: Arya Pub. House, 1937), p. 313.
[57]*Ibid.*, Second Series, p. 52.

and negations about the Absolute "are expressive of its aspects";[58] they are not based on illusory mental constructions, but have their truth verified in the ultimate reality;[59] "each thing that we call finite," he tells us, "is a representative figure, a form-front, a silhouette shadowing out something of the infinite, each a clue and a symbol."[60]

But inasmuch as the ineffable mode in which they are in the Absolute escapes our largest conceptions, he tells us that terms like omnipotence, omniscience, and so forth, are terms convenient for man; but, "when he strives to know it utterly, it seems to pass into something which neither any of these terms, nor the sum of them can at all represent."[61] Hence, he adds, our attribution of perfections taken from the appearances of things in space and time, "though real in their own field, are not essential";[62] nay they are even misleading, for they make us "take partial facts of being . . . for the whole truth of existence."[63] But the Reality in itself is so inconceivably ineffable that it is "indefinable and ineffable by mental thought and mental language . . . our mental affirmatives and negatives, whether taken separatively or together, cannot limit or define it."[64]

If Aurobindo had asserted only this much, he would have told us a commonplace truth of philosophy—that is, that human knowledge is not a comprehensive knowledge and, being a knowledge by abstraction, is necessarily partial and limited, a knowledge, as St. Thomas would say, "per modum compositionis et divisionis."[65] But from this natural incapacity of our mind to know things comprehensively and by direct intuition, Aurobindo unfortunately concludes that our mental knowledge—being a partial, a limiting, a dividing knowledge—is very largely "a falsifying knowledge,"[66] a knowledge "which makes us create or represent to ourselves a false world,"[67] a false view of reality. In other words, not to have comprehensive knowledge is to have no knowledge at all; to know something imperfectly is to know erroneously; to abstract is to falsify: *abstractio est mendacium.*

Once this principle was accepted, Aurobindo had no alternative

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[58] *Life Divine*, II, Part II, 522.
[59] *Ibid.*, 549; Part I, 37.
[60] *Ibid.*, II, Part II, 537.
[61] *Ibid.*, I, 72-73.
[62] *Ibid.*, II, Part II, 555-56.
[63] *Ibid.*, 549.
[64] *Ibid.*, 555.
[65] *Op. cit.*, I. 85. 1 ad 1.
[66] *Life Divine*, II, Part II, 662.
[67] *Ibid.*, Part I, 304.

but to logically affirm that since man's mental activity is confined to "the darkened and dividing operation of the mind,"[68] he cannot by the sole light of reason know the Absolute in its true reality. But to know the Absolute is his transcendental need. It is the very urge of his nature. He is not satisfied with knowing the relative realities; he wants to arrive at the knowledge of the Absolute.

Urged by the intrinsic and indomitable need for the knowledge of the Absolute, the human mind proceeds to know the Infinite by a process of analysis and division. The result is far from satisfactory. It just succeeds in catching "some reflected impressions of the Truth,"[69] some "bright or shadowy photographs or films of a distant Reality."[70] The more it tries to form a mental construction of the Absolute with these, the more it realizes that "it escapes the grasp of our thought and speech,"[71] that it is "beyond our mental distinctions and . . . discrimination,"[72] "beyond defining thought and formulating expression."[73]

Foiled in its attempts to know the Absolute by analysis and division, the human mind next tries the way of "supreme affirmation and supreme negation"[74]—the *neti, neti* ("not this, not this") of the Upanishads. It proceeds through an infinite series of conceptions and experiences, tries to empty them almost completely,[75] and excludes from the conception of the eternal Reality "all that offers itself as limitable by the senses and the heart and the understanding."[76]

But all in vain. For, Aurobindo tells us, by the way of supreme affirmations and negations "we rise at the apex of the pinnacle into that which is not only formless (*arupa*) but (*nirguna*) qualityless, the indefinable (*anirdeshyam*) of the Gita."[77] At the end of all our loftiest conceptions and representations "we are obliged to negate our largest conceptions, our most comprehensive experiences in order to affirm that the Reality exceeds all definitions"[78] "beyond anything that our largest and subtlest conceptions of infinity can shadow."[79]

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[68] *Ibid.*, I, 291.
[69] *Ibid.*, II, Part II, 955-56.
[70] *Ibid.*, I, 415.
[71] *Ibid.*, II, Part II, 555.
[72] *Isha Upanishad*, p. 28.
[73] *Life Divine*, I, 18.
[74] *Ibid.*, II, Part II, 522.
[75] *Isha Upanishad*, p. 29.
[76] *Essays on the Gita*, Second Series, p. 114.
[77] *Views and Reviews* (Madras: Madras Pub. House), p. 33.
[78] *Life Divine*, I, 52.
[79] *Essays on the Gita*, Second Series, p. 74.

We might at most succeed in constructing a mental form (*rūpa*) of It, but Its inmost nature, Its intrinsic form (*svarūpa*) will elude our utmost effort, because the "form of the Divine is beyond our thought, *anor aniyansam achintya-rupam.*"[80]

What, then, can our human mind ultimately predicate of the Absolute? Aurobindo tells us that all that we can, and must in truth, say about It is that It is an "unimaginable being,"[81] wholly incomprehensible to all logical thinking, "indefinable and ineffable by mental thought and mental language";[82] It is simply "inconceivable by finite and defining mind."[83]

Finding that these terms do not sufficiently bring out the transcendency of the Absolute, he apparently borrows the terminology of Kant and Spencer and calls his Absolute "the Unknowable Reality,"[84] "the indeterminable X,"[85] a something vast and formless, a Godhead "so much greater and other than the universe and all its forms that nothing here contains him, nothing expresses him really . . ."[86] It is indeed so far beyond our understanding, that "if we identify the Reality with any one definable state of being, however pure and eternal, with any particular attribute however general and comprehensive . . . our thoughts sin against Its unknowableness. . . ."[87] Hence, like Plotinus, he warns us that we should not even so much as presume to call it the One.[88]

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[80] *Ibid.*, p. 51.
[81] *Ibid.*, p. 73.
[82] *Life Divine*, II, Part II, 555.
[83] *Ibid.*, Part I, 41-42.
[84] *Ibid.*, I, 18, 46; II, Part II, 526.
[85] *Ibid.*, II, Part I, 27, 278.
[86] *Essays on the Gita*, Second Series, p. 73.
[87] *Life Divine*, I, 52.
[88] *Ibid.*, 193. Plotinus writes: "Even the term 'one' we must use with careful reservations. The first principle is not one as 'This one', or 'that one' " (*Enneads* vi. 9, 3; see *ibid.*, vi. 9, 5; 7, 37-38; v. 5, 6.). Dr. Inge in his *The Philosophy of Plotinus* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1918), II, 107-8, suggests that Plotinus only uses the word "one" because the Greeks had no symbol for zero. It must however be noted that Aurobindo does not agree with Plotinus that the One denies plurality. His One is not oneness by negation of plurality or division, but rather oneness by super-transcendence, an essentiality of everything and exceeding all. See *Life Divine*, I, 193; *Isha Upanishad*, pp. 25-27.

Aurobindo is opposed to the definition of a person as an individual endowed with intelligence and will. He understands by person a conscious being. A conscious being considered apart from its formulations of consciousness is an impersonal aspect of the person; considered together with its formulations, it is the personal aspect of the person. Since, according to Aurobindo, the Absolute cannot be identified with any one

Just as we cannot speak of it as One or the Many, so also, Aurobindo tells us, we cannot define God as personal or impersonal. He admits that the Upanishads generally designate the ultimate Reality by the neuter *Tat* ("That"). But his contention is that it is erroneous to deduce from this that the scope of the Upanishads was to teach the existence only of an impersonal and actionless Brahman. The neuter term, in his opinion, does not exclude the aspect of universal and transcendent Personality acting and governing the world.[89] "Saguna Brahman active and possessed of qualities . . . is only one side of the being of the Ishwara [Lord] ; the Nirguna immobile and without qualities is another aspect of His existence."[90]

But in the last analysis we must transcend even the impersonal-personal aspects, because, as Aurobindo has told us, if we identify the Reality with any one definable state of being, we sin against Its transcendency. "Brahman is the unknowable, beyond all conceptions of personality and impersonality";[91] It is to be regarded as something altogether beyond our understanding. It is indeed so far beyond our understanding that Aurobindo thinks that in an ineffable way It exceeds all human categories of good and evil, perfect and imperfect, finite and infinite, moral and immoral, and so forth, so that we could with equal truth affirm or deny of It either any of them or all of them.[92] We may, he tells us, even call the Absolute a "Nihil, or a non-existence"[93] without any prejudice to its absoluteness, even as we may call it a self-contradictory being. It simply transcends all human categories so that there is no telling whether a part may not be "greater than the whole because it belongs to the Transcendence."[94]

The conclusion is plain. Let us quote it in his own words.

> This paradox of an Absolute which can be realised through an absolute negation and through an absolute affirmation, in many ways, can only be accounted for to the reason if it is a supreme Existence which is so far above our notion and experience of existence that it can correspond also to our negation of it, to our notion and experience of non-existence. . . . The

aspect, he is necessarily led to affirm that God is neither personal nor impersonal.

[89] *Isha Upanishad,* p. 52.
[90] *Life Divine,* II, Part I, 87. See *Views and Reviews,* p. 33.
[91] *Isha Upanishad,* p. 52.
[92] *Life Divine,* II, Part I, 148.
[93] *Ibid.,* I, 73.
[94] *Ibid.,* II, Part I, 56.

> Absolute is the ineffable X overtopping and underlying and immanent and essential in all that we can call existence or nonexistence.[95]

In brief, "It is an infinite mystic Zero of Non-existence."[96]

Is Aurobindo then an agnostic? It is true that in opposition to the atheists he has maintained the existence of an Absolute. On the other hand, if the Absolute is really an unmanifest Unknowable as regards its nature so that we really cannot know its nature even in our limited way, then of what ontological and moral value is that Absolute to us? The answer to these questions may well be left over for another article.

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[95] *Ibid.*, p. 278.
[96] *Ibid.*, pp. 27, 278.

NOTES AND DISCUSSION

References to Beauty in St. Thomas

Germain G. Grisez

The following list is a collection of all the significant references to beauty which we have been able to find in the *Opera Omnia* of St. Thomas. The collection was made by skimming through all the writings of the Angelic Doctor and consulting all indices and reference lists available. We have omitted some references which include only a mention of beauty without throwing any light on his doctrine concerning it. Where numbers are given (e. g., #221-235) they are taken from the Marietti editions.

We do not claim that this is a complete list. We may have overlooked some significant references. But this collection is, at least, more complete than any we have seen. It should give a wider basis for research into Thomistic doctrine concerning the "soft, smooth, slippery" quality which we call *beauty*.

Summa Theologiae:
- I. 5. 4 ad 1.
- I. 25. 6 ad 3 (*decens*).
- I. 39. 8.
- I. 66. 1.
- I. 69. 1.
- I. 70. 1 (*ornatus*).
- I. 91. 3.
- I. 91. 3 ad 3.
- I-II. 27. 1 ad 3.
- I-II. 27. 2.
- I-II. 49. 2.
- I-II. 49. 2 ad 1.
- I-II. 49. 4.
- I-II. 50. 1.
- I-II. 52. 2.
- I-II. 54. 1.
- I-II. 55. 2 ad 1.
- I-II. 105. 1 s.c.
- II-II. 103. 1 ad 2.
- II-II. 116. 2 ad 2 (*decor*).
- II-II. 141. 2 ad 3.
- II-II. 142. 2.
- II-II. 142. 4.
- II-II. 145. 1 ad 3.
- II-II. 145. 2.
- II-II. 145. 2 ad 1.
- II-II. 145. 2 ad 2 (*decor*).
- II-II. 145. 3.
- II-II. 145. 4.
- II-II. 180. 2 ad 3.

Summa Contra Gentiles:
- II. 64.
- III. 70 (*decor*).
- III. 71.
- III. 94.
- III. 139.

Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum:
- I. 3. expositio primae partis textus.
- I. 31. 2. 1.
- I. 31. 2. 1 ad 4.
- II. prologus (*decor, ornatus*).

II. 34. 1. 1.
IV. 16. 2. 2. 1 ad 1.
IV. 18. 1. 2. 1.
IV. 18. 1. 2. 2 ad 1.
IV. 18. 1. 2. 2 ad 2.
IV. 24. 1. 1. 1.
IV. 44. 3. 1. 1 (*deformitas*).
IV. 48. 2. 3.
IV. 49. 3. 3. 2.
IV. 49. 4. 5. 3 ad 1.
IV. 49. 5. 1 ad 1.

Expositio in Librum Beati Job:
cap. 40, lect. 1.

Expositio in Psalmos Davidis:
XVIII. 1.
XXV. 5.
XLIV. 2.

Expositio in Isaiam Prophetam:
LIII. 2.

Expositio in Threnos Jeremiae:
IV. 7.

Expositio in Evangelium Sancti Joannis:
cap. 2, lect. 2.

Expositio in Epistolam ad Romanos:
cap. 12, lect. 1.

Expositio in Epistolam Primam ad Corinthios:
cap. 11, lect. 2.
cap. 15, lect. 6.

Expositio in Epistolam Primam ad Timotheum:
cap. 2, lect. 2.

De Veritate:
22. 1 ad 12.

De Potentia Dei:
4. 2 (*ornatus*).

De Malo:
8. 4.

De Virtutibus in Communi:
1. 9 ad 16.

Expositio in VIII Libros Physicorum:
VII, lect. 5.

Expositio in III Libros de Anima:
III, lect. 2, #597-98 (sensibilia delectabilia).

Expositio in Librum de Sensu et Sensato:
lect. 7, #101-02 (*colores delectabiles*).

Expositio in X Libros Ethicorum:
I, lect. 10, #124.
I, lect. 12, #142.
I, lect. 13, #159-60.
I, lect. 13, #163.
III, lect. 19, #604-11 (*sensibiles delectationes*).
IV, lect. 8, #738.
X, lect. 6, #2025-31.

Compendium Theologiae:
cap. 165.

Expositio in Librum de Divinis Nominibus:
cap. 1, lect. 2, #59.
cap. 2, lect. 1, #114-15 (*integritas*).
cap. 4 in toto (and throughout this work).

CHRONICLE

Saint Louis University has been given the unique privilege of obtaining microfilm copies of the precious medieval manuscripts of the Vatican Library. The costs of this important venture are being met by a grant of $150,000 from the Knights of Columbus. All who are interested in medieval philosophy will appreciate the impetus that will be given to historical studies in this period. The Reverend Lowrie J. Daly, S. J., of the Department of History of Saint Louis University and editor of the *Historical Bulletin*, is representing the University in Rome while this work is being done. The University plans to make this invaluable collection available to scholars who

are properly qualified to work in any of the pertinent fields (philosophy, theology, medieval history, canon law, and so forth), as well as give its graduate students in philosophy and history the opportunity of direct contact with the sources. THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN is proud to announce that the work of microfilming is already in full-scale operation and wishes to thank the Knights of Columbus for their far-sighted generosity.

THE SAINT LOUIS CHAPTER of the International Society for General Semantics presented a public panel discussion on May 17, 1951, in cooperation with Washington University (Saint Louis). Professor Lewis E. Hahn, chairman of the Department of Philosophy, Professor Homer Bishop, of the Social Work Group, and Dr. Don Fischer, assistant dean of the School of Engineering—all of Washington University—were the speakers on the panel.

THE MEDIAEVAL INSTITUTE of the University of Notre Dame held a "Mediaeval Institute Day" on April 27, 1951, at the Pierpont Morgan Library, New York. The Reverend Gerald B. Phelan, director of the Institute, spoke on the Institute itself, and the Very Reverend Canon A. L. Gabriel, gave an illustrated lecture on the daily life in a fourteenth-century college.

THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING of the American Catholic Philosophical Association was held in New York on March 27 and 28. The general subject of the program was "The Nature of Man." At the first general session, a paper on "The Nature of Man in St. Augustine's Thought" was given by Professor Elizabeth Salmon. Miss Salmon showed that though St. Augustine admitted the unity of man, yet his analysis proceeded through the opposition between sense and intellect; the nature of the soul is approached through certain knowledge. The immortality of the soul derives from the identity of its being, life, and intellect. Professor Charles J. O'Neil spoke at the same session on "St. Thomas and the Nature of Man." Doctor O'Neil's main concern was with man as *mens,* the moral mind. Man's unity in action derives from his unity in being and from the first principles of practical knowledge. Dr. O'Neil showed that Aristotle's emphasis on politics is at least in part due to his failing to see that each moral individual possesses the first principles of practical knowledge.

At the second general session the Reverend George P. Klubertanz, S. J., gave a paper on "The Psychologists and the Nature of Man." Modern psychologists (taking the term in a very wide, inclusive sense) are rediscovering the unity within the complexity of human activity. Three areas of particular significance to Thomists are those of the inter-

action of sense and intellect, of will and sense appetency, and of appetency and knowledge. Much evidence has been accumulated here, and the Thomistic account of man should exploit this evidence much more than it has. At the same general session Professor Lawrence E. Lynch spoke on "Existentialism and the Nature of Man." He showed how, in general, existentialism begins with the experience of ambiguity and anguish, and is deeply concerned with the problem of choice. Professor Lynch considered two existentialists in detail, Sartre and Marcel. In Sartre, he analyzed the relations of being, knowledge, and nonbeing. In Marcel, he considered knowledge as experience and contemplation of mystery, and showed the functions of fidelity, love, and disponibility in Marcel's account of man.

The afternoon sessions, as usual, consisted of round-table discussions in the various areas of philosophy and the history of philosophy.

At the annual dinner, His Eminence, Cardinal Spellman, greeted the members of the Association. The first awarding of the Association's Aquinas Medal (for outstanding achievement and service) was presented to Jacques Maritain. The citation was read by the Reverend Gerald Phelan; M. Maritain replied with an address, "Angelic Doctor." The Association address was given by Professor Dietrich von Hildebrand on "Transformation of the Nature of Man." The outgoing president, the Reverend Gerard Smith, S. J., selected as his topic for the presidential address "Reflections on the End of Man and the Atom Bomb."

At the business meeting Professor Elizabeth Salmon was elected vice-president. Last year's vice-president, the Reverend Francis X. Meehan, took over the office of president for the coming year. The place of next year's meeting was decided to be Cleveland, and the topic chosen was "Philosophy and Experimental Sciences."

In a majority opinion delivered June 11, Chief Justice Frederick M. Vinson stated: "Nothing is more certain in modern society than the principle that there are no absolutes." *Time* magazine (July 23) pointed out that this opportunistic relativism has been the faith of many lawyers and judges since the time of Oliver Wendell Holmes. It is disquieting to realize that this opinion is held by a man whose office it is to guard the "inalienable rights" of citizens and the integrity of the Constitution. In the same issue, *Time* names the same Mr. Vinson as close adviser of the President and possible candidate for the presidency himself. The prevalence of such moral relativism among the holders of public offices may go far to explain widespread public graft and irresolution in dealing with crucial issues.

The Philosophical Society of St. Patrick's College (Maynooth) has begun a philosophical journal, *Philosophical Studies,* with the Reverend James D. Bastable as editor. At present it is to be issued once a year, at a price of 3*s.* 6*d.* Articles in the first issue range from a survey of modern philosophy to a summary of recent thought on the structure of the universe. The journal seems to be aimed at an intelligent audience, though one not technically trained in philosophy.

The Société Européene de Culture, founded at a constitutional convention in Venice, May 28-June 1, 1950, has published an account in the second number of its periodical, *Comprendre.*

The first Congress of the Gesellschaft für internationale Wissenschaftsgeschichte was held in Bremen, April 23-26, 1951. Round table conferences were held on the various divisions.

On May 3, 1951, the directors of the Allgemeine Gesellschaft für Philosophie in Deutschland met under the chairmanship of the president, Professor Theodor Litt. It was decided to form a special group within the organization composed of teachers and writers of philosophy. It was also decided to postpone the next general meeting to 1953.

The University of Bologna plans to commemorate the eighth centenary of Gratian's influential *Concordia Discordantium Canonum.* A commemorative day and one or more volumes of commemorative essays are included in the plans.

The Institut Supérieur de Philosophie de Louvain plans to celebrate, in the beginning of October, 1951, the centenary of the birth of Cardinal Mercier, founder of the Institut. It is planned to endow a "Chaire Mercier," to which outstanding thinkers are to be called.

The organization of the projected Eleventh International Congress of Philosophy, to be held in Brussels, August, 1953, is now under way with the announcement of an executive committee of Belgian philosophers. Secretaries are Ch. Perelman and H. L. Van Breda. The address of the secretariate is Ch. Perelman, 32, rue de la Pêcherie, UCCLE-Brussels. The committee proposes to make the printed text of the communications available by May 15, 1953. According to plans, this means that manuscripts must be at the secretariate by December 15, 1952. Manuscripts should not be longer than eight pages, typewritten, double spaced. Further announcements will indicate the distribution of topics and will perhaps suggest themes.

BOOK REVIEWS

Modern Philosophies of Education. By John S. Brubacher. 2nd edition. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950. Pp. viii + 349. $4.00.

This volume is a revised edition of Professor Brubacher's book that was so well received in 1939. Catholic reviewers of the first edition pointed out two admirable qualities of the book: (*a*) its thesis that "educational systems are differentiated mainly by their underlying philosophies of life";[1] and (*b*) "a first-hand knowledge of the Catholic philosophy of education . . . a commendable effort to present it here objectively and understandingly."[2] Three new chapters have been added, "The Nature of Human Nature," "Professional Ethics," and "Consensus among Philosophies of Education." These new chapters give more evidence of the same admirable qualities of the first edition.

Regarding human nature, the author sees already the necessity of completing the scientific consideration of man with a philosophical consideration. He considers human nature under the following subdivisions: the constitution of human nature, original nature, learning, freedom of the will, and fallen and supernatural nature. Under these headings he presents the major philosophical positions quite objectively. The notion of human "faculty" is given more accurately than in the earlier edition. The statement of the Catholic theological teaching on fallen nature follows accurately a first-rate source. Professor Brubacher concludes the discussion of human nature by distinguishing two fundamental positions: (*a*) there is a spiritual entity at the heart of human nature that remains primarily constant in the midst of changes about man; (*b*) human nature is a component in a field of forces which require continual adjustment and modification. The author gives some hints of his own opinion. He does not side with strictly materialist or mechanistic theories of human nature which "probably overreach themselves at least at present" (p. 48).

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[1]E. B. Jordan, *Catholic Educational Review*, XXXVIII (1940), 624.
[2]A. Farrell, S. J., *Catholic School Journal*, XL (1940), 137.

Nor can he quite go along with a spiritual entity that is primarily constant.[3]

The new chapter on professional ethics is not very long or particularly illuminating. The author proceeds from the rather blind[4] Kantian principle of never using persons as means but always as ends. Teachers, as professional men, must have a greater sensitivity to this principle than others need have. Some rather doubtful conclusions appear. For instance, the teacher who fulfills the "minimum duties which will entitle him to his salary, is carrying on a trade and not a profession" (p. 116). Again, it is unethical to accept extra pay for special tutoring of a student. The reason is that "otherwise ambiguity arises as to whether the teacher has not neglected this pupil so that the parents, who may be well-to-do, would ask him to undertake this service" (p. 117). This line of reasoning looks very much as if the teacher is for the profession! In fact, page 118 carries a number of recommendations, such as not applying for a position until a vacancy arises or not accepting a position where the administrator is a blood relation, which are backed solely by the desire to build up the reputation of *The Profession*. The chapter ends with a discussion of teacher strikes, in which the principle (the good repute of the profession) does not even clarify the issues involved, let alone untangle them.

The point of the last chapter ("Consensus Among Philosophies of Education") is well taken. That point is better understanding among educators. The author lists agreements on the practical and philosophical level; then the philosophical disagreements, arising from metaphysical, theological, epistemological, and social differences; and finally, recommendations for reaching more consensus. He thinks quite rightly that a better knowledge of the opinions of others would help; also, that criticism should be intellectually sincere. But the reader, convinced by the whole book that an educator's philosophy is the factor controlling all the rest, is surprised to read that educators ought "not take themselves or their philosophies too seriously" (p. 337). The reason is that "conduct is as important if not more important than the theory which undergirds it" (*ibid.*). Were the question only of theories that are mental constructs made up purely to hold conduct together in the mind, this advice would be helpful. But some theories are intended to determine and guide conduct; and philosophies of education, as the present book shows clearly, are of

[3]See the last paragraph of this review.

[4]See John Wild. *Introduction to Realistic Philosophy* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1948), pp. 48-51.

this latter kind. Consensus among philosophies of education may or may not be attained; but it seems essential that, to be *philosophical* consensus, it should come about by hard thought, not enthusiastic action. The author implicitly admits as much in the last paragraph of the book.

Professor Brubacher deserves high recommendation for his unbiased handling of the Catholic philosophy of education. He has followed one of his own recommendations towards a future consensus among philosophies of education. Yet the fact is that his presentation, good as it is, is not quite good enough. One critical point is his understanding of "objective truth" (or "eternal verities") in Catholic philosophy as truth that exists in its own right, a kind of "eternal pattern" that can be discovered somewhere or in some books. "If truth is an eternal verity to be regarded as forever the same, an objective external reality is imputed to truth" (p. 321). When a teacher deals with such truth, "it will be legitimate for him to indoctrinate" (p. 323). Now, this reviewer does not think that all Catholic writers are any too clear about what they mean by "objective truth." Generally, the words are no more than a phrase intended to carry the epistemological doctrine of moderate realism. But this confusion about the nature of truth, though common enough perhaps to absolve Professor Brubacher from the charge of missing an obvious point, is nevertheless a confusion.

The Thomistic analysis of truth distinguishes between ontological and logical truth. The latter is the known conformity of the mind with reality; that is, the mind, in the act of judging, affirms that what is united in the mind as subject and predicate is also united in reality as thing and characteristic. This is generally called the "correspondence theory" of truth. But it can hardly mean, as the author states, that "on this basis truth is objective. It is preexistent to the search for it. Therefore the person engaged in educational research literally 'finds' the truth . . . Hence truth is not temporal; rather it is eternal, immutable" (p. 72). If logical truth is a conformity *of* the mind, it certainly must be *in* a mind and never any other place. A mind that happens to be conformed and does not know it, possesses no logical truth. On the other side, ontological truth is simply real things as knowable. No one can teach this; so it has little to do with our problem, except to emphasize that natural things are, and then we know them. When a Thomist speaks of eternal truths, he means knowledge not subject to change. Thus God's knowledge is not subject to change, because He is His knowledge and He cannot change. In other cases, the object *as conceived* may

not be subject to change—say, the number four—even though the existing things—say, four eggs—are very much subject to change.

With no existing "object truth" there is no place for indoctrination. And what precisely makes indoctrination unnecessary is the fact that man naturally understands the first principles of being—"cause and effect" is not one of them—and therefore has a beginning for knowing and being taught. Professor Brubacher puts first principles in the proper place (pp. 78 and 318), apparently without appreciating their central importance to the solution of the problem of teaching *without* indoctrinating.[5] As a consequence, on page 329 he concedes that it is probably permissible to "indoctrinate" in arithmetic. Also, he seems to think that holding self-evident truths has its basis in some "supernatural" ground (p. 336). There is at least one pragmatist that argues that the principle of noncontradiction is prior to all language.[6]

Underneath Professor Brubacher's misunderstanding of "objective truth" is another, and more metaphysical, misunderstanding. It concerns the Aristotelian and Thomistic explanation of change. The "potency" of Aristotle is read as potential, say, as in Newtonian mechanics; the potential is thus inchoate reality that comes out from under wraps when a cause comes along. Aristotle and St. Thomas use the notion of potency precisely to keep change and novelty in the world, not to get it out. Professor Brubacher sees it differently. The constant is viewed as truly real (p. 28); cause and effect imply there is nothing new under the sun (p. 31); learning is unfolding what was originally enfolded (p. 60); truth is eternal and immutable (p. 76); progress is not the revelation of antecedently complete reality (p. 299); learning makes definite what formerly was inchoate (p. 310); novelty is really only apparent from the viewpoint of immutable eternity (p. 320). Aristotle might consider this a fair summary of Plato's philosophy; St. Thomas could agree that it sounds much like St. Augustine's teaching. Neither would understand why he should be saddled with such an unsatisfactory explanation of a changing world. They both might, however, agree that their position could easily be misunderstood by any one who thinks that Darwin raised a metaphysical issue they had not considered.

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[5]See my article "Causality in the Classroom," THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XXVIII (January, 1951), 138-46.

[6]See E. G. Mesthne, "Status of the Laws of Logic," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, X, 354-72.

THE IDEA OF USURY. By Benjamin N. Nelson. No. 3, "History of Ideas Series." Princeton: Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. xxi + 258. $3.00.

This curious volume traverses approximately five thousand years of thought in about a hundred and forty pages, on a great many of which pages there are more footnotes than text. Usury is discussed from the possible meanings of the text of Deuteronomy down to the most recent works on the subject, including the reviewer's—which students are warned to use with caution. When we extract twelve of the hundred and forty pages to discuss the case of Father Jeremiah O'Callaghan in the early and middle nineteenth century, mere quantitative considerations force us to conclude that the book does not treat its subject with the thoroughness which the elaborate apparatus of scholarship so carefully maintained throughout would seem to imply.

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UNE PHILOSOPHY DE L'AMBIGUÏTÉ: L'EXISTENTIALISME DE MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY. By A. De Waelhens. Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1951. Pp. vi + 408. $3.00.

Alphonse De Waelhens has again accomplished an arduous task in the elucidation of existentialism. His earlier book, *La Philosophie de Martin Heidegger,* not only made Heidegger's tortuous reasoning more intelligible to foreign readers but also directly influenced Sartre's own thought. Now De Waelhens has turned his attention to one of the less well-known existentialists, Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Although he has not shared the limelight with Sartre, Merleau-Ponty is slowly becoming recognized as an original mind within the existentialist movement. To date, his reputation rests mainly upon two books, *La Structure du comportement* (1942) and, especially, *Phénoménologie de la perception* (1945). In addition, he has published two collections of philosophical essays on various practical issues of the day, *Humanisme et terreur* (1947) and *Sens et non sens* (1948). At present, he is working on a treatise on truth, one of the major fields which he has not thoroughly explored. De Waelhens makes an exhaustive report on the first two of these books and gives a brief sketch of the general position implicit in the two latter books. That he is a faithful expositor is testified by the fact that when Merleau-

Ponty reissued *La Structure du comportement* (1949), he invited De Waelhens to contribute an introductory essay on his philosophy as a whole.

There are two phases in Merleau-Ponty's dialectic—a criticism of the philosophies upon which scientists rely and an analysis of ordinary perception. The critique of philosophical principles invoked by practising scientists is placed first, since, in a world that is so receptive of scientific pronouncements, even our view of everyday experience takes on the pervasive coloration of the sciences. In his study of *comportement,* Merleau-Ponty indicates how the criticism of the philosophical underpinnings can be conducted. He concentrates upon the question of human behavior (taken broadly enough to include all of our attitudes and orientations), interrogating the behaviorists and the Gestaltists. It is his contention that the facts uncovered by these and other schools of psychology cannot be evaluted properly by means of the narrow categories inherited from classical modern philosophies. Thus behaviorism is powerless to deal with global perceptions and total reactions precisely because it is hampered by atomistic empiricism. It fails to overhaul the major premise of empiricism that only those factors into which experience can be analytically decomposed may be admitted to good scientific standing. Merleau-Ponty makes effective use of the researches of Kurt Goldstein in combatting the empiricist principle and exposing the inadequacy of behaviorism as an interpretative schema.

In a constructive way, Merleau-Ponty claims that the data ascertained by psychology can be given due recognition and explanation within a broadly conceived existentialist framework. His investigation of perception is an attempt to get behind the scientific view of the world to the more basic one of ordinary experience. This entails a reversal of the trends to judge perceptual findings exclusively by the standard of scientific description of objects. On the contrary, Merleau-Ponty vindicates the originality of the perceptual world as the real world and notes that the scientific construct has a real import only to the extent that it bears some reference to the deliverances of perception.

The appropriate instrument for exploring perceptual aspects of man and things is phenomenology. A reading of Merleau-Ponty can be unusually helpful as a gateway to the understanding of this discipline, especially for those who are ordinarily repelled by its abstractness and technical severity. Instead of starting with the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, it might be wiser to

lead up to him gradually through readings in other phenomenologists. The essential features of the method can be grasped readily from the writings of Merleau-Ponty. They have the advantage of beginning on the more familiar terrain of concrete psychological themes rather than with logical and formal problems, and, in addition, are exempt from Husserl's preoccupation with transcendental idealism. Yet there is a close resemblance between Merleau-Ponty and Husserl in his later period, so that the transition could be made easily from the one to the other. In the journey upstream to the headwaters, it would be useful to have the guidance and encouragement of Merleau-Ponty's more accessible reflections.

Among the expertly handled subjects are many existentialist themes. Merleau-Ponty makes a fresh approach to the problem of "my body," the relation between attention as a psychic fact and an index to man's being, the temporal and historical nature of consciousness, and the ambiguity of both our data and our attitudes toward them. He makes a running commentary on the views of the other existentialists, especially Heidegger and Sartre. His comments on his French colleague are always illuminating. Merleau-Ponty seeks to find some middle ground between Sartre and scientism. This is apparent in his treatment of freedom. As opposed to scientific determinism, he admits genuine freedom as an implication of attention. Yet he does not follow Sartre in the further assertion that our freedom is absolute and literally creative of the meaning of the world. He rightly holds that meaning is both imposed upon us by the world and freely discerned. There are some rewarding developments of the phenomenological commonplace about the correlation between levels of objective meaning and types of intentional attitudes required to disclose them. Merleau-Ponty comes closer to Heidegger's notion of truth as an existential unveiling than he is willing to admit.

De Waelhens carries on an alert discussion with Merleau-Ponty throughout the book, but there is only one fundamental disagreement: about the existence of the absolute being. Merleau-Ponty poses the dilemma that either God is self-enclosed and hence unattainable by us and of no concern to us, or else he is present by way of identification with the human spirit. De Waelhens, for his part, seeks to preserve both the immanence and the transcendence of God. Moreover, he maintains that philosophy can reason to the existence of a transcendent God, even though this inference goes beyond the scope of phenomenology. Because the absolute spirit is not directly revealed by phenomenological analysis, it does not follow that there is no realiza-

tion of spirit apart from man, but only that the phenomenological method cannot reach beyond the necessary structures of human experience. Both Merleau-Ponty and De Waelhens admit the need for a passage from phenomenology to metaphysics. But for Merleau-Ponty, metaphysics is reflection only upon the being-character of man and the world, whereas for De Waelhens it is broadened to include reflection upon being in general and the reference to the absolute being that is implied in our experience. De Waelhens shows that the affirmation of God is compatible with phenomenology and with Merleau-Ponty's restricted conception of metaphysics. But he does not back up with argument his assertion that the existence of God is indeed an implication of our experience.

The final portion of the book gives a rapid survey of Merleau-Ponty's views on history, politics, aesthetics, and religion (Catholicism). There is a curious reticence in the chapter on Merleau-Ponty's Marxian notion of social development. In this one instance, De Waelhens confines himself to exposition of his author. It is true that he defends Merleau-Ponty's "original Marxism" (which is anti-Stalinist and disillusionist in tenor) from the misunderstandings of the Hungarian Stalinist, Lukacs (whose name is invariably printed "Lucaks"). But he does not offer any independent criticism of this brand of Marxian humanism and does not inquire whether it is reconcilable with Merleau-Ponty's other tenets.

Finally, neither this book nor the other excellent studies in the "Bibliothèque philosophique de Louvain" series is provided with an index. Since these books are not light tracts, but solid achievements to which reference must often be made, this deficiency should be remedied before many more in the series are published. Certainly De Waelhens's masterful introduction to the existentialism of Merleau-Ponty deserves careful study and frequent reference.

James Collins

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Les Fondements Logiques des Mathématiques. By E. W. Beth. Paris: Gauthier-Villars, 1950. Pp. 220.

For those who wish an excellent introduction to the problem of foundations in mathematics Professor Beth's book will prove to be one of the best currently available. The immensity of the whole problem has been brought down to size. Professor Beth makes it possible for one not already initiated into the mysteries of symbolic logic and mathematical foundations to obtain an adequate understanding of the

more important features of a study that has been intriguing mathematicians and certain philosophers for some time.

One should not judge from the preceding that we have here a superficial account of the matter. Beth's book, while not exhaustive, is quite the opposite of superficial. There is, however, no excessive concern with minutiae, no matter how inviting; nevertheless, enough technical detail is included to give a good understanding of methods.

Proceeding from the historical setting of the problem and a brief, but sufficient, exposition of the elementary features of mathematical analysis (number system and the like), the author goes on to the precise axiomatic formulation of elementary logic; that is to say, first order predicate calculus. This naturally involves a notice of symbolic logic, the theory of proof, logical syntax, and semantics. In this connection, although the author renounces any claim to be giving a detailed account of researches on the "decision-problem," he does present a sufficiently complete discussion of this significant phase of mathematical foundations, indicating, for example, certain special classes of propositions for which a solution is obtainable.

In discussing the existence of mathematical entities, after a brief presentation of the *logical* position of Frege and Russell, Beth naturally specializes upon the most important area of the problem; that is, as it is found in the theory of sets where most of the early difficulties appear. An important part of his effort here is devoted to the study of the *intuitionist* position of Brouwer and followers.

Before the concluding chapter the author formulates and analyses eleven well-known antinomies which have importance in mathematical foundations.

The final chapter points out the relevance of the philosophy of mathematics to recent developments in philosophical thinking. A list of exercises is appended.

Granted that there is need for economy in publications of this type, the typography leaves much to be desired. It is printed by photo-offset from a typed copy and compares very unfavorably with similar American products. The use, for example, of the character "V" both for "$\vee$," a logical symbol, and for "V" representing a proposition, is confusing to the beginner and annoying to others. There are typographical errors, too, that will impede easy reading.

Although Professor Beth's book is neither original (in the graduate-school sense of the word) nor monumental (in the sense that Russell and Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica* was), it is nevertheless a commendable piece of work and worthy of the careful atten-

tion of anyone interested either casually or professionally in the philosophy of science.

Everett Larguier, S. J.

Spring Hill College

A History of Philosophy. By Frederick Copleston, S. J. Westminster, Md.: Newman Press. Vol. I, Greece and Rome, 1946, pp. x + 521, $4.00; Vol. II, Mediaeval Philosophy, Augustine to Scotus, 1950, pp. x + 614, $4.50.

Historical scholarship among Catholic thinkers has come to a period of brilliant bloom in the past half-century, yet most of the previous textbook writers in this field seemed to have remained in a state of antiseptic isolation. When Father Copleston began to embody the results of scholarship in a textbook for Catholic students of philosophy (directed especially to seminarians), it is no wonder that his work was greeted enthusiastically in England and in this country. And every reader must agree that he has done an almost awe-inspiring amount of work in reading and assembling information. Moreover, he shows himself well read in the original works of the men he is discussing.

Praiseworthy and impressive as Father Copleston's *History of Philosophy* is, this reviewer is of the opinion, however, that it has been injudiciously acclaimed. Since others have lavished praise, this review will concentrate on a critical evaluation of the chapters dealing with Plato, Aristotle, St. Bonaventure, and St. Thomas Aquinas.

The discussion of Plato's doctrine begins with a chapter on his theory of knowledge. Father Copleston expressly disclaims any intion of foisting a Kantian interpretation upon Platonism. But to treat Plato under the headings of the present-day Scholastic division of courses in philosophy, and still more to begin this discussion with the theory of knowledge, is itself an interpretation. Father Copleston admits "that it is difficult to separate Plato's epistemology from his ontology" (I, 142) and that Plato's primary interest is in "the true object of knowledge" (*ibid.*, 143). But is not the distinction between sensible and intelligible objects the sole distinction between perception and *nous*? Now, from the point of view of a thinker who has developed an epistemology, it may be possible to describe an interpretative theory of knowledge implied in Plato. But this is scarcely the function of a historian, even of a philosophical historian.

Again, in expounding the Platonic doctrine of "true being," it is

obviously important to insist on the distinction between the intelligible Form or Idea and the material singular. Father Copleston, however, hinges his whole chapter on "The Doctrine of Forms" around the question of the ontological status of the Forms and for the first ten pages of this chapter discusses this question almost exclusively. It is true that to imagine that the Forms had an existence like that of sensible things is "to make the Platonic theory gratuitously ridiculous" (*ibid.*, 168); but is it not equally true that to place the question as Father Copleston does is to make the Platonic theory gratuitously impossible?

A third point is of more general application. Father Copleston says that the essence of Plato's doctrine is "that to each true universal concept there corresponds an objective reality" (*ibid.*, 151). This merely says that Plato is essentially a realist—a reduction of a distinctive position to a general category. The reason for such a procedure seems to lie in the author's expressed intention to show the continuity of philosophical thought (cf. II, 9, 249, 562).

In presenting the philosophy of Aristotle, Father Copleston at one point follows a method that almost prevents clear understanding. While giving Aristotle's criticism of the Platonic Forms (I, 292-301), he inserts rejoinders which Plato might have made, as well as his own editorial comments. Though the author of a history of philosophy has a right to philosophize in his own name if he so wishes, this right does not excuse a confusing presentation. Nor is it altogether clear just why the author should be at such pains to point out the defects and errors of Aristotle. (For a similar instance of interspersed editorializing, see II, 327, 331, 339, 345, 385, 424-25.)

In beginning the chapters that deal with St. Augustine, Father Copleston wisely insists that it is foolish to consider him as but a "half-formed Thomist." Good; but why, then, the repeated apologies and apologetic comparisons with Thomistic thought? The student-reader will inevitably gather the impression that St. Augustine was important in his own time, but is of only antiquarian interest since the thirteenth century. Such an attitude is almost the opposite of what a course in the history of philosophy should generate.

In his summary and conclusion to the presentation of St. Bonaventure, Father Copleston seems again to wish to minimize the differences between him and St. Thomas, in accord with the tendency, already noted, to stress the continuity of philosophical thought. In presenting St. Bonaventure's doctrine on the possible eternity of a creature, the positions of St. Thomas are inserted into the presentation, making it difficult to get either theory straight.

St. Thomas gets a lengthy and detailed treatment (II, 302-434). In regard to matters of detail, it should be pointed out that Father Copleston confuses common sensible matter with intelligible matter (*ibid.*, 391); that he explains the "natural desire for God" in the sense of the desire which man has in the concrete, that is, as elevated (*ibid.*, 400-405); and that the positive content in our ideas of immaterial reality is rather poorly explained (*ibid.*, 394-95).

But certain more general matters are of greater importance. It is stated that there remained in St. Thomas's thought a "tension" between his Christianity and his Aristotelianism (*ibid.*, 428-30). The main reason for this point of view seems to be the author's notion of a philosophical synthesis. It would seem that for him a synthesis differs only in degree from an eclecticism (cf. *ibid.*, 559-63). This, it seems, is one of the real, abiding temptations for a historian of philosophy. By the nature of his undertaking he is constrained to seek for sources, follow up the slightest threads of influences. Now, St. Thomas (like Leibniz and Hegel) was widely read in most of his predecessors and was keenly aware of the multitudinous contemporary movements. Moreover, it was peculiar to the medieval thinker to put his thoughts under the patronage of, and into the terms of, recognized *auctoritates*. The historian will thus easily discern in St. Thomas influences (even quotations) from the Christian revelation, from Plato and Augustine, from the Arabians, and from the pure Aristotelian tradition. He knows that these distinct positions, as they existed in their origin, had various incompatibilities among themselves. An eclecticism consists in choosing various philosophial positions for various reasons, usually reasons particular to the area under discussion. A synthesis consists in a harmonious set of positions, arrived at by the use of the same principles (that is, analogously the same); it is called a synthesis because in fact the thinker has been stimulated by the differing positions of various other men and reaches positions which correspond to (but are never identical with) now one, now another position. (The distinction between *via* and *positio* is one explicitly made by St. Thomas in comparable contexts.) Moreover, in considering the thought of St. Thomas, it is absolutely necessary to realize that there are different levels or planes (for example, in metaphysics, the levels of substance and of being, as M. Gilson has pointed out in *Being and Some Philosophers.*) Thus, the Aristotelian philosophy of substance was transposed to become one of the levels of the Thomistic metaphysics. Thus, St. Thomas reaches a set of positions which correspond point

for point with those of Aristotle—correspond but are not identical. In Father Copleston's chapter "St. Thomas and Aristotle," neither of these distinctions is used.

The failure to use these distinctions may also explain some otherwise peculiar expressions. Father Copleston speaks as if philosophy were a series of hypotheses which in some instances cannot be verified (see *ibid.*, 276, first paragraph; 277, last sentence). Again, certain conclusions reached by modern non-Scholastic thinkers are said to belong to the *philosophia perennis* (I, 7); the contemporary Thomist is encouraged to "enlarge" Thomism (cf. *ibid.*, 4).

Nor are these the only points that might be made. For example, the treatment of the metaphysics of Duns Scotus is not satisfactory. For another example, Abelard is made out to be a kind of pre-Thomistic moderate realist.

In view of these defects, Father Copleston's *History of Philosophy* is not the book we have been waiting for. But it is to be hoped that his commendable aim and admirable energy will be a preparatory step for the appearance of a history of philosophy that will be both adequate to the state of scholarly knowledge and suitable for the beginning student.

George P. Klubertanz, S. J.

Saint Louis University

Contemporary Ethical Theories. By Thomas English Hill. New York: Macmillan Co., 1950. Pp. 368. $4.00.

This volume is an ambitious enterprise, for the author seeks "to survey, classify, and evaluate the significant moral theories of the present century" within the limitations of three hundred and sixty-eight pages. He views the book as useful for advanced classes in ethics, as reference material for professional philosophers, and as enlightenment for the educated public.

The work is divided into six parts. Part I is devoted to a presentation of ethical skepticism involved in logical positivism, behavioristic psychology, psychoanalysis and sociology, with criticisms of the exaggerations and weaknesses of these schools of thought. Part II treats the approbative theories in ethics. Part III deals with the process theories, and Part IV with the psychological value theories. The natural law theories of Maritain and Gilson are succinctly presented in Part V, the section on metaphysical theories; and Part VI is devoted to the intuitive theories in contemporary ethics.

In a concluding chapter Professor Hill contends that the task that lies before the moral philosophy of our day is (*a*) "to remove the needless linguistic confusion that now exists on account of repeated use of the same words for different meanings"; (*b*) ". . . to extend objective inquiries into the actual valuations and moral code of a variety of peoples"; and (*c*) to have moral philosophy "concern itself with the problems of practical morality at least to the extent of helping to mark out the broad outlines of value and duties and to indicate the principal motives for achieving the good and the right."

This book will serve as a good reference, in compact form, for those wishing a synopsis of the ethical theories of about sixty-five contemporary ethicists; but more detailed study of the works of these men is requisite for an understanding of their theories.

William S. Kraemer

University of Arkansas

Evolutionary Thought In America. Edited by Stow Persons. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. x + 462, with 24 plates. $5.00.

The plan of this book is a brilliant one, calculated to fill an important need for all who wish to understand the complexities of contemporary American thought. The impressive list of contributors and the wide scope of the topics are further commendations of the work. Part I presents the theory of evolution; Part II, the influence of this theory upon sociology, political and constitutional theory, economics, psychology, literature, architecture, moral theory, and theology.

Unfortunately, this plan was not put into execution with consistent excellence. Among the better essays are those by Theodosius Dobahansky—"The Genetic Nature of Differences among Men"; by Robert E. L. Faris—"Evolution and American Sociology"; Malcolm Cowley—"Naturalism in American Literature"; and Donald Drew Egbert—"The Idea of Organic Expression and American Architecture." While suitable on the one hand for undergraduate consumption (the essays grew out of a lecture series at Princeton, 1945-46), they are rich enough in content to provide worth-while information and illuminating insights to all except experts in these fields.

Some of the essays, however, fall far below this level. Robert Scoon, writing on "The Rise and Impact of Evolutionary Ideas," touches on philosophical and religious backgrounds with which he

is obviously not familiar. In apparent ignorance of the nonevolutionary, but nevertheless nonfixist, interpretation of St. Augustine, he says that Platonism and the "myth" of Genesis fostered a belief in fixism. Again, he says that the Platonic and Aristotelian theories of knowledge, as contemplation, made discovery of truth unnecessary (page 10); it is about time that reputable writers cease imputing the theories of Averroes or Roger Bacon to Aristotle or St. Augustine. F. S. C. Northrop, writing on "Evolution in its Relation to the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Culture," commits more, and more brazen, historical errors. He ranges widely and confidently from Plato to Whitehead, a performance that supposes either a mastery of the entire field of philosophy or diligent and detailed research in the philosophers spoken of (yet for documentation we are offered mainly references to previous writings of the same author!). Professor Northrop, for instance, maintains that all metaphysics is based on physics or the philosophy of nature (p. 48; this may be true of British empiricism, p. 61); in the sense of the author, it is not true of Aristotelianism. Again, speaking of Aristotelian form, he says that heat and cold are substantial forms (p. 49) and comes up with a preposterous notion of form by privation (p. 50). He states that an Aristotelian must hold that there is one social order for all men at all times (p. 70), being evidently ignorant that Aristotle holds and demonstrates the opposite. In delineating his own approach, Professor Northrop maintains that the philosophy of the good must be grounded on a philosophy of science (pp. 75-78); this is a serious mistake. Though he correctly asserts that the "good for man" must be anchored in reality, he does not achieve this by basing it upon physical theory. William F. Quillian, Jr., discusses "Evolution and Moral Theory in America." He seems to be in favor of some form of evolutionary ethics, though not of the old-fashioned social Darwinianism. From his account of Dewey's ethical theory it becomes clear that, though this theory is rational with respect to means, it is irrational and practically hedonistic with respect to the ends of human action. Edwin G. Boring considers "The Influence of Evolutionary Theory upon American Psychological Thought." He succeeds in making the behavioristic movement intelligible by showing its motivation and indicates that in this as well as other cases the theory of evolution played an important but not an essential role. His assessment of American psychologies has an oddly relativistic flavor, in that the particular character of these theories is said to be due to the American temperament.

After reading the various articles, one conclusion seems to be almost universally borne out: the original attempts to apply evolutionary theory to other than biological facts were unsuccessful and had to be abandoned. Obviously not all the authors admit this conclusion. Moreover, where it was successfully applied, it was so modified as to suit the specific facts; where it has not been properly accommodated to the subject matter (as in ethics), its application has been unfruitful.

George P. Klubertanz, S. J.

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Structure, Method, and Meaning: Essays in Honor of Henry M. Sheffer. Edited by Paul Henle, Horace M. Kallen, and Susanne K. Langer. Frontispiece portrait of Dr. Sheffer. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1951. Pp. xvi + 306. $4.50.

In the Preface (pp. v-vii), which survives its own incidental lapses from standards of good taste, Horace M. Kallen explains that these essays are published "in spontaneous acknowledgement of the comrade's qualities of mind and heart" (p. v). And Felix Frankfurter testifies in the Foreword (pp. ix-xi) that "this remote, lonely, abstract thinker of unuseful thoughts is lovable, morally radiant, and infinitely good-humored" (p. xi). All students of Professor Sheffer will share this esteem and read these essays with enthusiasm.

Alonzo Church opens the section on "Structure" (pp. 3-87) with "A Formulation of the Logic of Sense and Denotation" (pp. 3-24), wherein it is stated that "intentional logic must ultimately receive treatment by the logistic method. And it is the purpose of this paper to make a tentative beginning toward such a treatment along the lines of Frege's doctrine" (p. 3). The scope is broad; the contemporary erudition vast; the treatment highly technical. C. I. Lewis contributes some important and illuminating "Notes on the Logic of Intension" (pp. 25-34). It is, for example, remarked that

> the difference between an extensional and an intensional system is not one with respect to the analytic character of the asserted functions; no valid calculus of logic includes any nonanalytic assertion. The difference is that, in an extensional system, the analytic character of postulates and theorems is not asserted, and not distinguished from the character of nonanalytic truth, because "A is analytic" cannot be symbolized or defined in terms of the logical constants of the system without addition. In an

> intensional system, the modalities of functions—"analytic," "nonanalytic"; "consistent," "inconsistent"; "deducible," "nondeducible"; and so on—are symbolized and distinguished from nonmodal truth. As a consequence, in any application of an extensional calculus, the peculiarly logical questions of analyticity, consistency, and deducibility have to be discussed in terms of some adjoined metalogic or metalanguage; whereas the laws governing such properties are, for an intensional calculus, statable within the system itself (pp. 25-26).

Furthermore

> logic can assert no expression unless it is true by virtue of its intensional meaning, and it can assert no expression to be false except one which is contravened by virtue of its intension. That there is such a thing as extensional logic is due to the fact that certain truth-functions are analytic by reason of the intensional meaning of the logical constants which figure in them and of their syntax (p. 28).

Although currently "there exists no calculus symbolizing both ex tensional and intensional functions of terms" (p. 28), nor "even any calculus which is recognized as an intensional logic of terms" (p. 28) yet the Boolean algebra exists and is "*interpretable* as a logic of terms in intension" (p. 29). But not without difficulty. Hence a "convenient basis for an intensional logic of terms can be developed much more simply. . . . An outline of this system . . . the 'calculus of predicates' . . . follows" (p. 30). And after depicting the anatomy of the system, Lewis significantly remarks that "the whole logic of propositions could be regarded as a special case of this calculus of predicates [as] . . . propositional terms signifying states of affairs. Thus the calculus of predicates could be taken as the basic branch of logic in general" (p. 34). A lucid and significant essay, bristling with constructive suggestions for those who desire the devices of modern logistical analysis but are constitutionally opposed to the orientations of an exclusively extensional development.

James Wilkinson Miller, motivated by practical pedagogical interests, submits in "The Logic of Terms" (pp. 35-41), a battery of

> algebraic tests, or sets of rules, for the validity of eduction, sorites, super-eduction, super-syllogism, and supersorites. A restatement of Mrs. Ladd-Franklin's method of treating the syllogism will also be included, in order that the presentation of the branch of applied logic with

> which this paper is concerned may be complete (pp. 35-36).

The treatment is neat, rigorous, economical, efficient, and adaptable to schoolroom uses. Further advance toward a definitive solution of Henry S. Leonard's proposed "Two-Valued Truth Tables for Modal Functions" (pp. 42-67) is here made. Independently of its technical competence, the essay is most interesting and illustrative because it thinks on paper and exhibits how one progresses by tentative trial, discovered error, and revisions directed toward better success. Paul Henle observes that

> Boolean algebra is closely connected with the number two. It has two unique elements, a law of double negation, and, in finite models, the number of elements is a power of 2. An algebra, or rather a family of algebras, is easily conceived which generalizes from 2 to n in respect to the characteristics listed above (p. 68).

Such algebras are sketched in his "N-Valued Boolean Algebra" (pp. 68-73). The structure is so designed that "the Sheffer stroke function may be considered, not merely as the basic operator of Boolean algebra, but also of a wider family of algebras" (p. 73).

In his "Triangular Matrices Determined by Two Sequences" (pp. 74-83), L. L. Silverman purposes to

> obtain a triangular matrix T which will include in a single definition the special cases of Nörlund and of Riesz. Cesàro's definitions, being special cases of those of Nörlund, as well as Euler's definitions $\mathrm{E}(\theta)$, are also included in T. The Hausdorff matrix is *not* included in T. But necessary and sufficient conditions are obtained that the matrix T be permutable with M—that is that T be a Hausdorff matrix (pp. 75-76).

The essay succeeds as an elegant exhibit of rigor and generalization. Although W. V. Quine is aware that "arithmetical versions of the ordered pair are no novelty" (p. 87), still there is point in suggesting a new function in "The Ordered Pair in Number Theory" (pp. 84-87) which possesses "the special virtue of identifying, not only each pair with a number, but also each number with a pair" (p. 87). The exposition is clear, concise, convincing.

Norbert Wiener introduces the "Method" (pp. 91-206) section by a historico-critical discussion of "Pure and Applied Mathematics" (pp. 91-98) wherein due notice for the *right* reasons is given to the impressive mathematical stature of Riemann, Poincaré, Hilbert. F. S. C. Northrop is correctly convinced that

> Western scientific knowledge, when it is most effective, is deductively formulated knowledge indirectly verified

> experimentally. This being the case, unless one has learned to think deductively and systematically, considering in relation to one another and the experimental evidence the three major deductively formulated theories of modern physics—particle physics, field physics, and quantum mechanics—thereby revealing the basic theoretical problems to which the rival postulate sets of these three theories give different answers, one literally does not even know what the basic problems of contemporary physics are, to say nothing about having first-rate science. Such is the importance for the natural sciences of the method of deductively formulated theory and the theoretically defined problems which such theories generate (p. 103).

Because of this conviction he undertakes to exhibit likewise "The Importance of Deductively Formulated Theory in Ethics and Social and Legal Science" (pp. 99-114). One by-product of this approach is that

> the meaning of ethical propositions and concepts can no more be determined . . . by analyzing individual ethical propositions apart from the deductively formulated or formulatable philosophical assumptions of the philosopher making the analysis, or of the philosophy of the particular culture from which the sentence gets its socially communicable meaning, than can the meaning of individual propositions in deductively formulated natural science and natural philosophy be determined by considering any specific proposition by itself in isolation. Failure to note this vitiates most ethical theory of contemporary philosophers (p. 105).

For it is Northrop's pointed charge, and it sticks, that this procedure is to commit the fallacy of "the simple location of ethical meaning" (p. 105). And the lesson may well be heeded that long ago

> natural scientists learned that the way to be objective is not to try to get along without concepts and theory, but to get the concepts and theory which one is using out into the open, so that nothing is being smuggled in surreptitiously and everyone can see precisely what the ideas or concepts are. The scientific method for doing this most effectively is the method of deductively formulated theory. This method forces one to specify the primitive concepts designating the elementary entities and relations in terms of which all of the observed and inferred data in one's subject matter are being described. In short, the way to keep facts from being corrupted by faulty ideas and bad theory is not to be hard-boiled and attempt to get along without ideas by restricting oneself

> to pure fact alone, but to pay as much attention to the ideas or concepts one uses to describe the facts as one does to the facts being described (p. 106).

And pursuant to this procedure "the objective social scientist is one who makes sure that the conceptualization of the facts of a foreign culture which he portrays is the conceptualization of the people in that culture, rather than his own" (p. 107). Furthermore, "it is only by means of the method of deductively formulated theory that one can even formulate clearly the problem of an absolute or universal ethical norm" (p. 110). And it is Northrop's sanguine conclusion that "the method both for determining and for transcending the relativity of ethical and legal norms of the world may be at hand. It seems to be that of deductively formulated theory applied to each of the many cultures of the world and to nature, and then used to converge on a common set of assumptions" (p. 114). The program, if too optimistic, is at least profoundly interesting and important, particularly for a philosophical tradition that presumes to ground its analysis on the *constants* of human nature. Sociological researches of this character promise to confirm or disconfirm the validity of metaphysical analysis.

The best exposition anywhere of Francis Bacon's philosophy of science is presented by C. J. Ducasse (pp. 115-44) in a persistent and painstaking piece of work, as detailed and as definitive as desirable. A task of drudgery but indispensable to the historical self-consciousness of contemporary science. Ducasse catches with authentic echo Bacon's messianic mission to "restore to science its proper place of servant to the will of man, rather than merely of delight to his intellect" (p. 115). Notice is given to

> the contrast, which so often strikes one in Bacon's writings, between the soundness of his insights when he deals with topics in abstract fashion only and the defectiveness of his translations of such insights into concrete terms (p. 117).

A remarkably clear exposition is given to the relation of physics to metaphysics in Bacon:

> *Both* are concerned with processes and configurations *of minute particles*; and metaphysics, which is concerned with the "fundamental and universal laws" of nature, merely pushes the inquiry further than physics, which stops at her "particular and special habits." Most definite on this point is the passage [*De augmentis scientiarum* 3. 4] where the kinds of results which the physical and metaphysical inquiries, respectively, yield are con-

> cretely described in terms of the investigation of whiteness (p. 133).

Observing with acute attention to the relevant texts that

> the laws that Bacon thinks of are laws of the causation *of our sensations,* by certain states or motions of matter; while the laws which really have the practical value that Bacon thought of are laws of the causation *of states or changes of matter* by other states or changes of it (p. 135, n. 47),

Ducasse concludes on excellent documentary evidence that

> undoubtedly, Bacon himself had but a hazy consciousness of what he meant by a form. Therefore no *clear* statement of the meaning of the term can be taken as a *reproduction* of his thought, but on the contrary must very definitely be taken as an attempt to *construct,* on the basis of the material constituted by his statements, a thought latent in them indeed yet to which he himself never fully attained (p. 138).

In sum, as is commonly agreed but not heretofore on such copious textual grounds, "Bacon's greatness may perhaps most truly be said to lie in having written lines between which so much that was true and vital was later so plainly to be read" (p. 139).

To be right is to earn the right to be forthright. With such uninhibited candor (and superb grace) does George Sarton pen the equivalent of an open letter to the Harvard University authorities in his "The History of Science versus the History of Learning" (pp. 145-51). It is Dr. Sarton's contention, and it is faultlessly correct, that from the purely technical and utilitarian point of view, "the results of scientific research are recipes, theories, schemata, systems, abstractions" (p. 148). Consequently, and the inference is flawlessly valid, "the teaching of science being unavoidably nonhistorical or antihistorical, the history of science must be taught as a complement and correction" (p. 146). But it is obvious, and the observation is correct, that "learning and the history of learning go hand in hand. Humanities and history are inseparable. Humanists are historians, and historians are humanists" (p. 147). Hence, and the conclusion follows legitimately,

> a committee on the history of science is absolutely necessary to make possible the obtention of higher degrees in that field, for members of the scientific departments lack historical interest and competence. On the contrary, a committee on the history of learning is superfluous; for any attempt to investigate a part of the history of

> learning would be supervised in the best manner by the department of learning concerned (p. 150).

The case is presumably closed and all that remains is official dissolution of the joint Harvard committee. Local papers please copy. For the issue transcends Cambridge.

C. Hillis Kaiser discloses that "the method of methodology" (pp. 152-70) in point of fact

> cannot proceed by first determining exactly the method of science, then the method of religion, the method of philosophy, and so on. This is merely assuming that these disciplines can be exactly isolated prior to the analysis. But if the methods of the given disciplines cannot be determined successively, then they must be determined simultaneously. . . . What is required is a method of coordination rather than a method of isolation, a "coordinate" rather than a "linear" method (p. 157).

The remainder of the paper consists in a tentative execution of this coordinate method with respect to science, art, philosophy, and religion. In the course of this able work, it is noted that "science and technology are not two phases of one process, as certain contemporary methodologists would have us believe, but two distinct disciplines" (p. 164). Moreover, and more importantly,

> the elementary facts of empirical science . . . are not perceived elements but relationships between such elements, and propositions which assert that such relations do hold are expressions of the act of categorical judgment. . . . Propositions, therefore, which assert relationships between elements all of which are perceived are the true "atomic propositions" of empirical science. . . . If we assume that there is an objective state of affairs corresponding to the atomic proposition, then such a state of affairs may be called an "atomic fact" (p. 165).

Nonempirical, formal, or abstract science, however,

> attempts to discover the relationships which hold between the members of a set of propositions by virtue of the fact that some (if any) of the set are denominated "true" and others (if any) "false". Logic has in particular the task of isolating these relations and of analyzing the internal structure of propositions in so far as it determines these formal relationships. What is significant for our purposes is that formal science is a discipline of discovery, and, in fact, a discovery of relationships, but the terms of the relations are now propositions or propositional elements [and not perceived elements]. Since in

> all of this there is no appeal to perception, we may properly label it "abstract" or "formal" (p. 166).

Epistemologists who endorse and expound that logical truth, in full bloom, is a *relation* of conformity between what the true statement expresses and the state of affairs of which it is said to be true, will not miss the relevance of the above analyses of the character of both empirical and formal sciences. Dr. Kaiser's paper is modest, earnest, sincere; but its competence is a function of the author's variable acquaintance with each of the four disciplines considered. If this is a criticism, it merely means that Dr. Kaiser is not yet a paragon polymath. Surely an excusable defect. But no task is more vital to cultural cohesion in the contemporary context than the completion of the work that Dr. Kaiser here advances.

Professor Sheffer recently inquired of Susanne K. Langer what possible grounds there might be for denominating by the term "form" entities that defy expression in verbal or algorithmic propositions. The answer emerges, in "Abstraction in Science and Abstraction in Art" (pp. 171-82), out of a richly stocked experience of aesthetic values. In effect the answer is that

> many people stoutly maintain that art is concrete and science abstract. What they should properly say—and perhaps really mean—is that science is general and art specific. For science moves from general denotation to precise abstraction; art, from precise abstraction to vital connotation, without the aid of generality (p. 182).

For in artistic experience the pattern perceived is "*seen related*, not seen and then rationally related" (p. 181). It is interesting to speculate how much, if any, of this analysis could be contrived as a pendant to Aquinas's *quae visa placent*. Marvin Farber's "Reflections on the Nature and Method of Philosophy" (pp. 183-206) is precisely *reflections*, some clear, some foggy; some diffused, some refracted; some steady, some flickering; some polychromatic, some monochromatic; but only some. For other and significant opinions are unconscionably omitted. His critique of Dewey *iunior* is good, but pedestrian and currently trite. The rest of the reflections are always informative, because Farber is competently informed; interesting, because Farber is deeply interested; but rarely instructive, because Farber is a mirror foil and not a light source.

Carroll C. Pratt inaugurates the section on "Meaning" (pp. 209-306) with a richly detailed historical background to "the meaning of mind" (pp. 209-16) in contemporary psychology. One is reminded sharply of "the apparently unbridgeable gap between the belligerent

behaviorists, on the one hand, and the fighting Wundtians or classical psychologists on the other'' (p. 211) that existed as a scandal twenty-five years ago. But

> the change which has taken place in psychology since the twenties is radical, although probably not fully appreciated by some members of the profession—especially the younger ones—and certainly not by outsiders. It would be well nigh impossible, in a scientific meeting today, to start an argument among psychologists over the relative merits of different kinds of subject matter or initial data. The issue is regarded as dead and buried. . . . It is neither the protocols [of human subjects] nor the responses [of animals] themselves that are of chief importance, but rather what is done with them (p. 216).

Because of the deontologizing purification of all contemporary empirical research, to say that psychology is the study of mind is to say nothing at all *in science.*

Since the idea was shared at least by both Sheffer and James, Ralph Barton Perry, author of the *Thought and Character of William James* (1935), undertakes in ''A Note on Neutralism'' (pp. 217-24) to explore anew ''what impelled James to adhere to realism despite the fact that his experientialism was constantly deflecting him toward idealism'' (p. 222). Four reasons are disclosed: (1) idealism's foremost argument, that ''the world can't be thought of except *as* thought of,'' is fallacious; (2) transcendence is characteristic of perceptual experience; (3) knowledge is always of an object other than the knowing act; (4) the role of knowledge is to fit the action to the antecedently existing state of affairs.

From ''The Meanings of Unity Among the Sciences'' (pp. 225-41) H. M. Kallen pillories one and prefers another. For

> whatever other meanings ''unity of science'' may have, this [totalitarian] one it rejects absolutely, ineluctably. If ''unity of science'' intends the coordination of the different data of the different sciences into a single system or order, it cannot mean that kind of coordination, excluding alternatives. If ''unity of science'' intends the transposition of all the sciences into a single language, it cannot be that kind of language, composed of universal and invariant signs. If ''unity of science'' means an unchanging and all-embracing method, identical for all of the sciences, it cannot be the method of that kind of unity, eliciting only foregone conclusions. If ''unity of science'' implies authority for the sciences, it cannot be that kind of authority, enslaving thought,

> destroying the doubt which expresses at once the freedom and the creative power of intelligence. Whatever other meanings "unity" may have for the sciences, the totalitarian would be the ruthless destruction of them all. Let "unity of science" mean what it may, there is no place for it in the same world with totalitarian unities (pp. 226-27).

This is the villain that Kallen abominates. The more acceptable view is not " 'integration', with its implication of numeral wholeness, of seamless, static totality without fissure, without movement, without conflict" (p. 241), but rather "*orchestration,* with its implication of diversities of instruments and parts, of movements and pauses, of dissonance and discords as well as harmonies, of sequences whose every new item suffuses without deindividualizing all that have gone before" (p. 241). Kallen does not disclose who shall write the orchestrated score. Or are we to suppose that orchestration is somehow automatic? Is a Toscanini superfluous? And if not, are concert renditions thereby tainted with totalitarianism? And how different, *in fact,* in their respective spheres are a Toscanini and a Thomas?

Exploiting remarks of Heinrich Scholz in his *Metaphysik als strenge Wissenschaft,* Charles Hartshorne contributes "Strict and Genetic Identity: An Illustration of the Relations of Logic to Metaphysics" (pp. 242-54), in which the conventional concept of substantial-identity-throughout-process is strenuously shaken in a test analysis. The central argument is that "a whole is always numerically different if the least constituent is different; but the constituents need not all be numerically different just because some constituents, and with them the whole, are so. Thus it is simple logic to conceive the same (the man) as common constituent in the different (the events, states, or experiences), not vice versa" (pp. 246-47). Possible evasions of this argument are forestalled by a presumably valid dilemma: "*Either* an identical logical subject is to be credited with both the earlier and the later predicates, and this is Leibnizianism; *or* a numerically different subject is required for the later predicates, and this is Whiteheadianism. To say that the later subject is only partially different is not really a third position" (p. 246). It can only mean "the failure to see the merely verbal character of certain modes of predication (those seeming to make the more concrete a qualification of the abstract)" (p. 252). And the scholion: "The common-sense meaning of all this is roughly equivalent to the old concepts, but the precise logical and meta-

physical analyses are widely different'' (p. 253). But what Hartshorne has unwittingly established—and the reader is invited to discover it for himself—is that no *other* concept of substance can survive rigorous logical analysis but the act-potency, *principia entis* construction. For *only* the latter is successfully dynamic and ontologically polar.

Felix S. Cohen sees correctly and with a vision that is not as common as it is correct that

> the importance of Einstein's special and general theories of relativity is not that they make us see that motion is relative to an observation post. This was recognized long ago. The real importance of Einstein is his development of formulas by which many different accounts of the same physical event may be correlated with one another, so that from the position and direction of an event in any physical system we can calculate its position and direction in any other system. Einstein has made it possible for us to say that what is reported as a straight line in one system will be reported in another system as a curve of a defined form (p. 260).

Because he sees this he provocatively suggests in ''Field Theory and Judicial Logic'' (pp. 255-81) that

> what is needed in law, if law is to become more scientific in the future than it has been in the past, is a body of learning from which we can predict that what looks like a straight story or a straight sale from one standpoint will look like a crooked story or a crooked sale from another, and from which we can predict the successive ''distortions'' that any observed social fact will undergo as it passes through different value-charged fields in the ''world-line'' of its history (p. 260).

The principal field-factors for law are found ''in the suppressed moral premises of judicial opinions, in the selection between words of different value-tones, in the interpretation of facts and precedents, and in the tracing of lines of causation'' (pp. 273-74). The perspectives opened by this paper are important and provocative of further analysis. Donald C. Williams closes the volume with the claim, in ''The Sea Fight Tomorrow'' (pp. 282-306), that he has rescued from a certain large and important class of criticisms, notably those of Aristotle and of C. D. Broad, ''the idea, equally essential to antique ontology and to modern physics and logic, that there 'exists' an eternal world total in which past and future events are as determinately located, characterized, and truly describable as are southern events and western events'' (pp. 305-06). The rescue is effected mainly by distinguishing between ''determinedness and

determinateness, and being and being known'' (p. 294). The novel twist to the discussion concerns ''the uncanny preference which moves some philosophers to assert the unreality of the future on arguments which are equally valid or invalid against the past or the spatially remote'' (p. 306). More remains to be said, but before one presumes to speak about it in the future, it is essential to consider Williams's thesis that ''past, present, and future are ontologically on a level with one another and with west and south, and are equally real'' (p. 306). An able and interesting, if exuberant and rhetorical, essay.

This is indeed a splendid and precious volume. It is replete with good and meaty things. Whenever one finds the answers inadequate for one reason or another, it is usually because the questions are so good. If there be any Rip van Winkles among professional philosophers, there is no better way to resume, on revival, the role of an informed contemporary than to peruse the pages of this competent and cosmopolitan anthology. It is an excellent tribute to an excellent philosopher.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS PUBLISHED IN NORTH AMERICA

For the purposes of this bibliography, "philosophy" will be understood in a very broad sense. It will include works in other fields—such as sociology, aesthetics, and politics—that involve philosophical principles and problems. "Current" books will be understood to include new books, revised editions, and reprints if the previous printing had been out of stock for a notable period of time, or if there is a notable difference in price, format and the like.

The procedure is as follows:

1. *Books announced for publication will be listed in the issue which next appears after the announcement is received.*
2. *Books actually published will be listed in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 above.*
3. *Books received by* THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN *will be listed with full bibliographical information and a descriptive and/or critical note in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 and/or No. 2. This will be done even if a full review is to appear later.*

ALLEN, E. L. *Christian Humanism. A Guide to the Thought of Jacques Maritain.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1951. Pp. 46.

———. *Christianity and Society. A Guide to the Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1951. Pp. 45.

———. *Creation and Grace. A Guide to the Thought of Emil Brunner.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1951. Pp. 46.

———. *Freedom in God. A Guide to the Thought of Nicholas Berdyaev.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1951. Pp. 43.

———. *The Self and its Hazards. A Guide to the Thought of Karl Jaspers.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1951. Pp. 45.

———. *The Sovereignty of God and the Word of God. A Guide to the Thought of Karl Barth.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1951. Pp. 45. [Paper, $5.00 for the set].

This set of popular introductions, first published in England by Hodder and Stoughton in 1950, achieves the not inconsiderable goal of avoiding error and erroneous impressions. It conveys as good an impression of its subjects as can be found in an average history of philosophy, though the booklets are not so complete or on so technical a level. They can be recommended to readers who do not have the background to follow more technical presentations or the complexities and nuances of the authors' own writings.

ALLPORT, GORDON W. *The Individual and His Religion.* New York: Macmillan Co. $2.50.

ARISTOTLE. *Aristotle.* Selected and translated by Philip Wheelwright. New York: Odyssey Press, 1951. Pp. 384. $2.00.

———. *Physica.* Edited by W. D. Ross. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. 214. $2.25.

AUGUSTINE, ST. *Against the Academics.* Translated from the Latin by John J. O'Meara. "Ancient Christian Writers," Vol. 12; Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1951. Pp. 219. $3.00.

———. *Commentary on the Lord's Sermon on the Mount; with Seventeen Related Sermons.* Translated by Denis J. Kavanagh. New York: Fathers of the Church, 1951. Pp. 388. $5.00.

———. *The Confessions of St. Augustine, Books 1-10.* Translated by F. J. Sheed. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1951. Pp. 223. $1.50.

Avicenna On Theology. Translated by Arthur J. Arberry. Hollywood-by-the-Sea, Fla.: Transatlantic Arts, 1951. Pp. 88. $1.00.

AYER, ALFRED JULES. *Language, Truth and Logic.* 2d ed. New York: Dover Pubns., 1950. Pp. 160. $3.00.

BALZ, ALBERT G. A. *Cartesian Studies.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press; June, 1951. Pp. x + 310. $4.50.

BARNES, WINSTON H. F. *The Philosophical Predicament.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1951. Pp. 184. $2.50.

BARON, SALO WHITTMAYER, and OTHERS, (eds.). *Freedom and Reason.* Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951. Pp. 468. $5.00.

BAUMGARDT, CAROLA. *Joannes Kepler. Life and Letters.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1951. Pp. 209. $3.75.

This brief biography of Kepler contains extracts from many letters. The emphasis is rather on the man and his personal relations and feelings than upon his scientific work. One would have wished a more complete presentation of the correspondence. The letters of Kepler and the narrative of the author are printed in exactly the same way, and the reader is constantly exasperated by this typographical blunder.

A short introduction has been written for the book by Albert Einstein. There is a brief bibliography and an index.

BERDYAEV, NICOLAS. *Dream and Reality.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1951. $4.50.

BERTOCCI, PETER A. *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion.* New York: Prentice-Hall. Pp. 608. $4.75.

Bhagavad-Gita or The Lord's Song. Translated by Lionel D. Barnett, with an 80-page introduction, and full notes. Boston: Beacon Press, March, 1951. Pp. 211. $1.00.

BLUCK, R. S. *Plato's Life and Thought.* Boston: Beacon Press; April, 1951. Pp. 200. $2.50.

BOOLE, GEORGE. *An Investigation of the Laws of Thought.* New York: Dover Pubns., 1951. Pp. 424. $4.50.

BOURKE, VERNON J. *Ethics.* "The Christian Wisdom Series"; New York: Macmillan Co., summer, 1951.

BRADLEY, F. H. *Ethical Studies* (*Selected Essays*). With an introduction by Ralph G. Ross. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1951. Pp. xviii + 174. Cloth, $1.80; paper, 80c.

This twenty-eighth volume in "The Little Library of Liberal Arts" contains four essays from the *Ethical Studies,* including Bradley's notes. The essays here reprinted are: "Why Should I Be Moral?" "Pleasure for Pleasure's Sake," "Duty for Duty's Sake," "My Station and Its Duties," and the "Concluding Remarks." These essays constitute a challenging position and a trenchant criticism of naturalism and Kantianism. The Introduction is straightforward and illuminating.

BRÉHIER, ÉMILE. *The Philosophy of Plotinus.* Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., Oct., 1951. $3.00.

BRIGHTMAN, EDGAR SHEFFIELD. *An Introduction to Philosophy.* Rev. ed. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1951. Pp. 366. $3.60.

BROWN, G. BURNISTON. *Science.* New York: W. Norton & Co., 1951. Pp. 189. $3.50.

BROWN, LENA WILLIAMSON. *Analysis of Reality.* Lawrence, Kans.: Allen Press, 1951. Pp. 51. $2.00.

BRYAR, WILLIAM. *St. Thomas and the Existence of God. Three Interpretations.* Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., Oct., 1951. $3.50.

BUCKLEY, WILLIAM F., JR. *God and Man at Yale.* Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., Oct., 1951. $3.50.

BURLEIGH, WALTER. *De Puritate Artis Logicae.* Edited by Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M. St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute Publs., 1951. Pp. xvi + 115. $1.50.

BURTT, EDWIN ARTHUR. *Types of Religious Philosophy.* Rev. ed. New York: Harper & Bros., 1951. Pp. 479. $4.50.

BUTLER, J. DONALD. *Four Philosophies.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1951. Pp. 564. $4.00.

CHASE, STUART, and OTHERS. *The Social Responsibility of Management.* The Edward L. Bernays Foundation Lectures of 1950. New York: New York Univ., School of Commerce, Accounts and Finance, 1951. Pp. 96. $2.00.

Christianity and Reason. Edited by Edward D. Myers. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. Pp. 185. $3.00.

CHURCHMAN, C. WEST, and ACKOFF, RUSSEL L. *Methods of Inquiry.* St. Louis: Educational Publs., 1950. Pp. 558. $6.00.

This "introduction to philosophy and scientific method" is designed as an elementary textbook on scientific method. The first part analyzes scientific method by means of historical positions, through rationalism, empiricism, and Kantian criticism. It then considers the modern versions of these methods—the speculative method, positivism, logical positivism, and pragmatism. The second part applies the three modern methods to logic, physical science, biology, psychology, sociology, and ethics. The authors attempt to show that pragmatism is the most successful in all these areas and that the pragmatic method of philosophy is the only one. [*To be reviewed*]

CLOUGH, SHEPARD B. *The Rise and Fall of Civilization.* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951. Pp. 285. $4.50.

Contemporary Political Science; A Survey of Methods, Research and Teaching. (UNESCO Pubn. No. 426.) New York: Columbia Univ. Press. Pp. 711. Paper, $5.00.

CORNFORD, FRANCIS MACDONALD (ed.). *Greek Religious Thought.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1951. Pp. 287. $3.00.

CULBERTSON, JAMES T. *Consciousness and Behavior.* Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown Co. Pp. 224. $4.25.

DAVITT, THOMAS E., S. J. *The Nature of Law.* St. Louis: Herder, 1951. Pp. vi + 274.

DEMPSEY, PETER J. R., O.F.M. Cap. *The Psychology of Sartre.* Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1950. Pp. 174. $3.00.

The first part of this book studies the nature of man as envisaged by Sartre. The second part criticises this conception from the viewpoint of experimental psychology, psychoanalysis, and Thomistic philosophical psychology. [*To be reviewed*]

D'ENTRÈVES, ALEXANDER PASSERIN. *Natural Law.* New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1951. Pp. 126. $2.00; text. ed. $1.60.

DESCARTES, RENÉ. *Meditations.* Translated with an introduction by Laur-

ence J. Lafleur. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1951. Pp. xvi + 80. Paper, 50c.

This twenty-ninth volume in the "Little Library of Liberal Arts" contains a translation of the *Meditations*, but without the various sets of objections and answers that appear in the Latin and French editions. Since Professor Lafleur had given a doctrinal introduction to Descartes in an earlier volume (the edition of the *Discourse on Method*), he here discusses the translation (and the choice or omission of the objections and various letters) and also develops some terms which Descartes uses in this work; finally, he points out some changes of emphasis in the *Meditations*.

DE UNAMUNO, MIGUEL. *The Tragic Sense of Life.* New York: Dover Pubns. Pp. 332. $5.00.

DICKINSON, EDWIN DEWITT. *Law and Peace.* Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1951. Pp. 159. $3.25.

DUPEE, FREDERICK WILCOX. *Henry James.* New York: William Sloane, 1951. Pp. 314. $4.00.

EWING, ALFRED CYRIL. *A Short Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1951. Pp. 286. $3.00.

FARQUHARSON, ARTHUR SPENCER LOAT. *Marcus Aurelius, His Life and His World.* Edited by D. A. Rees. New York: Salloch, 1951. Pp. 160. $2.00.

FINLAY-FREUNDLICH, E. *Cosmology.* International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. I. No. 8. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1951. Pp. 59. Paper, $1.25.

This monograph presents a summary picture of the facts and theories about the origin and formation of the universe. As such, it is extremely important for the philosophy of nature. [*To be reviewed*]

FISHER, R. A. *Creative Aspects of Natural Law.* Fourth Arthur Stanley Eddington Memorial Lecture. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. 28. 50c.

FLEW, A. G. N. (ed.) *Logic and Language.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1951. Pp. vii + 206. $3.75.

This collection of essays has as its purpose to illustrate the method and content of the "linguistic movement in philosophy," mainly as it is practised in Great Britain. The Introduction gives the reasons for selecting this particular group of nine essays, and a very brief account of the background of the movement. The articles show in general the range of the problems attacked by this linguistic method: logic, philosophy of science, knowledge and criteria of knowledge, moral philosophy, political theory, and philosophy of religion. It is very interesting to compare the method and tone of these essays, their "plain English" and their calm, with the production of the parallel movement in the United States. [*To be reviewed*]

FLEWELLING, RALPH TYLER. *Conflict and Conciliation of Cultures.* Stockton, Calif.: College of the Pacific Press, 1951. $3.00.

FORD, JOHN C., S. J. *Depth Psychology, Morality and Alcoholism.* Weston, Mass.: Weston College Press, 1951. Pp. 88. Paper, $1.00.

This monograph is reprinted from the *Proceedings* of the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Catholic Theological Society of America. The first part deals with unconscious motivation and moral responsibility; the second part with the nature of alcoholism and the moral responsibility of the alcoholic.

In the first part, Father Ford is embarrassed by the fact that depth psychology cannot be summarized, for that term refers to a number of similar doctrines which contain mutually incompatible propositions. In such situations the search for a common denominator is not satisfactory. In his evaluation of depth psychology, the author seems not to have available a philosophy of scientific theory, so that he tends to consider psychological propositions as either directly descriptive or philosophical in content.

The second part, on alcoholism, is much more rewarding. The author is at home in both the clinical experience and the scientific theory. All who are interested in the nature of moral responsibility, its conditions and limitations, can profit a great deal from this study. There is a bibliography.

FRANK, LAWRENCE K. *Nature and Human Nature.* New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press. $3.00.

Freedom and Culture. Compiled by UNESCO. Introduction by Julian Huxley. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. 270. $3.75.

GEWIRTH, ALAN. *Marsilius of Padua, the Defender of Peace.* Vol. I, *Marsilius of Padua and Medieval Political Philosophy.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. xvi + 342. $4.75.

Studies on the extremely important political philosophy of Marsilius of Padua have up to the present not been entirely satisfactory. This volume in the "Records of Civilization, Sources and Studies" aims at filling this gap. In successive chapters, the author studies the historical background, the principles of Marsilius's political theory, the state and peace, the nature of law, the people as legislator, the government, the church; the concluding chapter attempts an estimate of the significance of Marsilius. There are a detailed bibliography and an index. [*To be reviewed*]

GILBERT, MABEL CRAWLEY, and GILBERT, ROSS WINTHROP. *Origin and Development of the Human Race.* Boston: Christopher Pub. House, 1951. Pp. 96. $2.25.

This little book is a highly speculative account of the origin of man (a theory which a scientist would tend to call philosophical, and a philosopher, scientific). Instars, central bodies, an animated universe, are but the most unusual elements of a recapitulation theory that combines precise fact with far-fetched theory.

GILLISPIE, CHARLES COULSTON. *Genesis and Geology.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. Pp. 328. $4.50.

GOUDGE, THOMAS A. *The Thought of C. S. Peirce.* Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1950. Pp. xii + 360. $5.00.

This study of Peirce finds two main threads in his thought: naturalism and transcendentalism. The naturalism is analyzed in terms of inquiry, both in itself and in the fields of mathematics, phenomenology, logic, and metaphysics. The transcendentalism is said to be found in mathematics, logic, and phenomenology, and to be more directly concerned in metaphysics, ethics, and theology. There is a detailed index. [*To be reviewed*]

GOULD, WILLIAM D., and OTHERS. *Oriental Philosophies.* 3d ed., rev.; New York: Russell F. Moore Co., 1951. Pp. 233. $4.50.

GROTIUS, HUGO. *De Iure Praedae Commentarius.* "Classics of International Law," No. 22; New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1951. 2 vols. Pp. 472; pp. 163. $10.00.

GUITON, JEAN. *Essay on Human Love.* Translated by Melville Chaning-Pearce; foreword by the Earl of Halifax. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1951. Pp. xi + 243. $4.50.

This significant reflection on human love, published in 1948 under the title *Essai sur l'amour humain,* was largely written during the author's confinement in a concentration camp. As is to be expected, it is a deeply thoughtful book.

It is divided into three parts. In the first part, "The Mystery," the author studies the various themes and expressions of love. In the second part, "The Development," the history of love is considered in its various aspects. In the third part, "The Significance," the author draws his conclusions about sex and human love. [*To be reviewed*]

HAMBURGER MAX. *Morals and Law. The Growth of Aristotle's Legal Theory.* New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. 213. $3.75.

HAMM, VICTOR M. *The Pattern of Criticism.* Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1951. Pp. xi + 308. $3.25.

This book is mainly a textbook of literary criticism. It has relevance for the philosopher, in that, as its author explicitly states, criticism implies philosophic commitments. The philosophic background of this text is Aristotelian and Thomistic. There are a selected bibliography and an index.

HAMMOND, MASON. *City-State and World State.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. Pp. 227. $4.00.

HARRIS, ERROL E. *The Survival of Political Man.* New York: Hafner Pub. Co., 1950. Pp. 236. $4.00.

HAYEK, F. A. *John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor. Their Correspondence and Subsequent Marriage.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1951. Pp. 320. $4.50.

This book contains the correspondence of Mill and Mrs. Taylor during the first eighteen years of their friendship, together with all available contemporary evidence concerning this relationship. The backgrounds necessary for an understanding of private correspondence are carefully filled in by the editor.

This is an important work for understanding J. S. Mill's personal life; it also throws light on the direction of his thinking. Moreover, the evidence uncovered goes to show the strong influence of Mrs. Taylor upon that thought.

HELSON, HARRY (ed.). *Theoretical Foundations of Psychology.* New York: Van Nostrand, 1951. Pp. 806. $7.25.

HENLE, ROBERT J., S. J. *Method in Metaphysics.* The Aquinas Lecture, 1950. Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. vii + 73. $2.00.

This is a bold and brilliant attempt to state and describe the origin of first principles with a view to showing by example the existence and nature of a distinctive philosophical method. If first principles are not innate but acquired; if, inasmuch as they are judgments, they are not subsistent and so cannot simply be passively received; if, finally, our intellectual knowledge begins with sensible reality, then it is necessary for the philosopher to show how he arrives at his principles. Thomists usually have failed to do this, partly because they seem not to have realized its importance and partly because of the great difficulty involved. Father Henle has drawn on his own experience as a philosopher and as a teacher of philosophers, as well as on his knowledge of the text of St. Thomas, to describe the origin of philosophical insight. The book is highly

recommended for philosophers and students of philosophy. [*To be reviewed*]

HERZ, JOHN H. *Political Realism and Political Idealism.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, April, 1951. Pp. 350. $3.75.

HOBHOUSE, LEONARD TRELAWNEY. *Morals in Evolution.* 7th ed. New introduction by Morris Ginsberg. New York: Macmillan Co., 1951. Pp. 702. $5.00.

HOFFMAN, ROSS J. *The Spirit of Politics and the Future of Freedom.* Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1951. about $1.75.

HOLLOWAY, JOHN. *Language and Intelligence.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1951. Pp. 207. $2.90.

HOUSTON, PERCY H. *Our Educational Discontents.* Boston: Christopher Pub. House, 1951. Pp. 125. $2.75.

This is an examination of the progressive, pragmatic, scientific education widely practiced in this country. The author studies the proposed goals and methods of this system of education, and finds them wanting in the distinctively human characteristics, wanting even in the social betterment which they extol so highly. He then examines the humanistic tradition and concludes that we must return to the humanities if we want to save the hard-won values of our culture, and, in our turn, add to them.

HUMPHREY, RICHARD. *Georges Sorel, Prophet without Honor.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. Pp. 246. $4.00.

Index Translationum. II. (UNESCO Pubn. No. 800.) New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. 386. Paper, $4.00.

INGALLS, DANIEL HENRY HOLMES. *Materials for the Study of Navya-nyāya Logic.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. Pp. 181. $6.00.

JOERGENSEN, JOERGEN. *The Development of Logical Empiricism.* International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. II, No. 9. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1951. Pp. 100. Paper, $1.25.

This monograph takes up the history of empiricism in the twentieth century, to the year 1940. A postscript by Norman M. Martin continues the history to 1950. The first part of this history deals with the Vienna circle, its origin, presuppositions, and program. The second part presents the expansion and development of logical empiricism. [*To be reviewed*]

JOLIVET, REGIS. *Introduction to Kierkegaard.* Translated from the French by W. H. Barber. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co.; Aug., 1951. $4.00.

JOYCE, GEORGE HAYWARD. *Principles of Natural Theology.* 3d ed.; New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1951. Pp. 620. $4.50.

KANT, IMMANUEL. *Critique of Judgment.* Translated by J. H. Bernard. Edited, with an introduction by Ralph G. Ross. New York: Hafner Pub. Co., April, 1951.

———. *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics.* Translated with an introduction by Lewis W. Beck. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1950. Pp. xxiv + 136. Cloth, $1.75; paper, 75¢.

This twenty-seventh volume of "The Little Library of Liberal Arts" is an excellent translation, incorporating the page numbers of the Academy edition for convenience in the use of commentaries. The clear and concise Introduction is written from within the Kantian point of view. There are a bibliography and an index.

KAPP, REGINALD OTTO. *Mind, Life and Body.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1951. Pp. 213. $2.50.

KEYSER, C. J. *The Rational and Super-Rational.* New York: Scripta Mathematica. $4.25.

KILPATRICK, WILLIAM H. *Philosophy of Education.* New York: Macmillan Co., April, 1951. Pp. 500. $4.75.

KLUBERTANZ, GEORGE P., S. J. *The Philosophy of Human Nature.* Revised edition; St. Louis: THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, 1951. Pp. vii + 193. Paper, 8½″ x 11″, $3.00.

This is the revised edition of a textbook in the philosophy of human nature (philosophy of man, rational psychology), issued in an experimental edition in 1949. The text is aimed at college students; it presupposes a course in logic. The structure of the text is inductive, passing from experienced activity through powers to nature. The last chapter summarizes the matter in a synthetico-deductive movement. Each chapter is ended with formal definitions, proofs, and suggestions for further reading. There are two sets of appendices, the first group of which treats opposing philosophies of man, while the second takes up special questions not directly pertinent to the course but vitally interesting to the student (such as the theory of evolution). There is an index.

LAMONT, CORLISS. *Humanism as a Philosophy.* 3d ed.; New York: Philosophical Lib., 1950. Pp. xxii + 368. $3.75.

A new preface has been added to this edition, in which the author makes some protestations of tolerance, and attempts to answer some of his reviewers. However, his answer did not wait for the publication of the more seriously philosophical reviews; and the fact that he has no difficulty in disposing of some criticisms should not be taken to mean that he has faced, let alone vanquished, all his "adversaries." This book was reviewed in THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN (XXVIII [January, 1951], 156-59).

LANDELS, THOMAS DURLEY. *The Secret of Happiness.* Boston: Christopher Pub. House, 1951. Pp. 80. $1.75.

This little book might be used as supplementary reading for courses in the philosophy of religion. It presents a Christian (Unitarian) point of view.

LASSWELL, HAROLD D., and KAPLAN, ABRAHAM. *Power and Society.* New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. $4.00.

LEWIS, CLARENCE IRVING, and LANGFORD, COOPER HAROLD. *Symbolic Logic.* New York: Dover Pubns., 1951. Pp. 506. $4.50.

LOCKWOOD, DEAN P. *Ugo Benzi: Medieval Philosopher and Physician, 1376-1439.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1951. Pp. 482. $8.00.

LODGE, RUPERT. *Applying Philosophy.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1951. Pp. 243. $2.75.

———. *The Great Thinkers.* Boston: Beacon Press, April, 1951. Pp. 320. $3.00.

MANGONE, GERARD J. *The Idea and Practice of World Government.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. 289. $3.75.

MAQUET, JACQUES J. *The Sociology of Knowledge. Its Structure and Its Relation to the Philosophy of Knowledge.* Translated by John F. Locke. Preface by F. S. C. Northrop. Boston: Beacon Press, 1951. Pp. 337. $5.00.

MARCEL, GABRIEL. *Being and Having.* Translated by Katharine Farrer. Boston: Beacon Press, 1951. Pp. 240. $2.25.

This book is a translation of *Etre et Avoir.* As those who are acquainted with the French original already know, it consists largely of a "Metaphysical Diary," together with papers on "Outlines of a

Phenomenology of Having," "Some Remarks on the Irreligion of Today," "Some Thoughts on Faith," and "Peter Wust on the Nature of Piety." Because a diary has no internal organization and because the book is without an index, it can most suitably be read by being dipped into now and then. Read meditatively, the profound reflections can strike forth insights of very great value.

There is a preface by D. M. MacKinnon. [*To be reviewed*]

———. *Homo Viator. Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope.* Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., Oct., 1951. $4.00.

———. *The Mystery of Being. Vol. I. Reflection and Mystery.* Translated by G. S. Fraser. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1950. Pp. xiv + 219. $3.75.

This volume contains the first of the two series of Gifford Lectures given at the University of Aberdeen in 1949 and 1950; it has already been published in England.

In the Introduction, the nature of philosophic thought is defined as *research.* One of the characteristics of this thought, according to Marcel, is its personal character; and so there seems to be a break between truth and universal validity. However, it is rather the break-up of the modern world that is the source of the objection. Hence, reflective thought must get back to its source in the need for transcendence. Marcel is then led to study truth as a good of man, the nature of philosophical reflection, of feeling, of being in a situation. He goes on to consider what man is and what it means to coexist with others. The volume concludes with a study of presence as mystery. [*To be reviewed*]

———. *The Mystery of Being. Vol. II. Faith and Reality.* Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., Sept., 1951. $3.75.

MARITAIN, JACQUES. *Philosophy of Nature.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1951. $3.00.

MARSILIUS OF PADUA. *The Defensor Pacis of Marsilius of Padua.* Translated by Alan Gewirth. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; fall, 1951.

MARX, MELVIN H. *Psychological Theory.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1951. Pp. 608. $5.00.

MAYER, CHARLES. *Man: Mind or Matter?* Translated with a preface by Harold A. Larrabee. Boston: Beacon Press; March, 1951. Pp. 200. $2.50.

MAYER, FREDERICK. *A History of American Thought.* Dubuque, Iowa; Wm. C. Brown Co., 1951. Pp. x + 399. $4.00.

This introductory history of American thought covers the entire period from the Puritans to contemporary thinkers. The author attempts to include everyone whose thought can have philosophical implications; the result is that no thinker is treated thoroughly. At times Mr. Mayer understands his subject so largely that passages read like a history of American culture. The author has a definitely slanted point of view; in his admiration of science and his abhorrence of what he calls "academic" philosophy, he shares the viewpoint of a Deweyite liberal. [*To be reviewed*]

MAYER, FREDERICK, and ROSS, FLOYD H. *Ethics and the Modern World.* Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown Co., 1951.

MCBURNEY, JAMES H., O'NEILL, JAMES M., and MILLS, GLEN E. *Argumentation and Debate.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1951. Pp. vii + 336. $3.50.

This book is included in this Bibliography for two reasons. First,

it is an excellent application of the principles of logic and so may profitably be used for examples and exercises in a logic course. Secondly, whereas many books on this subject are extremely superficial and conduce to a facile sophistry, this book integrates its particular matter into the whole of the student's life and into the whole of a liberalizing, democratic education. A good example can be found in the discussion of the need of *individual* moral standards (pp. 33-35) in connection with the analysis of the issues in a given proposition.

McCRACKEN, D. J. *Thinking and Valuing.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1951. Pp. 247. $2.50.

METZ, RUDOLF. *A Hundred Years of British Philosophy.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1951. Pp. 828. $5.25.

MISCH, GEORG. *The Dawn of Philosophy.* Translated by R. F. C. Hull. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. 347. $4.50.

MISES, RICHARD VON. *Positivism, a Study in Human Understanding.* Translated, with the collaboration of the author, by Jerry Bernstein and Roger C. Newton. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. xi + 404. $6.00.

This is an elaborate exposition of an all-inclusive positivistic philosophy. The author, who considers Otto Neurath as an ideal, aims to apply positivism to all areas and forms of knowledge.

The first two parts of the book—language and analysis—are, as it were, the structure of the theory. The next two parts—the exact theories and causality and probability—apply the theory to mathematics, logic, and physics, though they also begin to touch on questions of the philosophy of nature. The fifth part—science and the humanities—aims to show the continuity between the physical sciences, history, the life sciences, and the social sciences. The sixth part discusses metaphysics and art. The seventh part takes up human behavior. There is an index of names. [*To be reviewed*]

MOLINA, LUIS, S. J. *Political Excerpts from Law and Justice.* Translated by George Albert Moore. Chevy Chase: Country Dollar Press, 1951. Pp. 115. $5.65.

MORE, SIR THOMAS, ST. *Utopia.* Translated from the Latin by Ralph Robinson. Revised edition with spelling modernized. "Everyman's Library"; New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1951. Pp. 447. 95¢.

MULLANEY, THOMAS U., O. P. *Suarez on Human Freedom.* Baltimore: Carroll Press, 1950. Pp. xvi + 200.

This is a textual study of the doctrine of Suarez on the freedom of man. The first part is an exposition of the doctrine itself. The second is an investigation of the concepts of act and potency, which the author asserts are the basis of the Suarezian doctrine. This is then followed by a criticism. [*To be reveiewed*]

MUNRO, THOMAS. *The Arts and Their Interrelations.* New York: Liberal Arts Press, Mar., 1951. Pp. xvi + 559. $7.50.

NATANSON, MAURICE. *A Critique of Jean-Paul Sartre's Ontology.* Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1951. Pp. vi + 136. Paper, $1.00.

This study consists of two parts, an exposition of Sartre's ontology and an evaluation. The exposition is thorough and accurate, though it is awkwardly articulated. In the criticism, notice is first taken of certain objections against existentialist writing, which are based on misunderstandings (the author treats at some length the remarks of V. J. McGill and A. J. Ayer). The author's own criticism may be summed up in three remarks: Sartre has not correctly followed

the phenomenological method; he has not adequately handled the dualism of the *en-soi* and the *pour-soi*; he has tried unsuccessfully to advance the Kantian Copernican revolution. In explaining his first criticism, the author says that Sartre's phenomenology is Hegelian; this is to some extent true; yet the mere fact that Sartre's method is not Husserlian is not a valid philosophical criticism.

NATHANSON, JEROME. *John Dewey.* New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons; Sept., 1951. Pp. 130. $2.00.

OAKELEY, HILDA DIANA (ed.). *Greek Ethical Thought.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1951. Pp. 268. $3.00.

OWENS, JOSEPH, C.SS.R. *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics.* Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1951. Pp. xi + 461. Paper, $5.00.

This study, which was the author's doctorate thesis at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, is a profound and detailed analysis of the Aristotelian texts on being, together with a sensitive commentary that is aware of the long history of Aristotelian interpretation. The author's way of reading the texts is a new one: he does not take them up in the chronological order of their composition, nor according to the pedagogical order of presentation, but according to the order in which Aristotle wanted them read. In the face of divergent interpretations of the meaning and unity of the Aristotelian metaphysics, Father Owens finds that in Aristotle the primary instance of being and entity is the separated entity. The elaborate and painstaking scholarship that lie back of this conclusion is suggested by the hundred and twenty-two pages of notes in small print, and the twenty-two packed pages of bibliography.

M. Etienne Gilson has contributed a preface. [*To be reviewed*]

PAINE, THOMAS. *The Rights of Man.* Introduction by George Jacob Holyoake. "Everyman's Library"; New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1951. Pp. 309. $1.25.

PARSONS, TALCOTT (ed.). *Toward a Theory of Action.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; June, 1951. $5.00.

Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, The. Edited by Paul A. Schilpp. Revised and enlarged, with complete bibliographies of the philosopher's published writings to 1951. New York: Tudor Pub. Co., June, 1951. $6.00.

Philosophy of George Santayana, The. Edited by Paul A. Schilpp. Revised and enlarged, with complete bibliographies of the philosopher's published writings to 1951. New York: Tudor Pub. Co., June, 1951. $6.00.

Philosophy of John Dewey, The. Edited by Paul A. Schilpp. Revised and enlarged, with complete bibliographies of the philosopher's published writings to 1951. New York: Tudor Pub. Co., June, 1951. $6.00.

PIGOU, ARTHUR CECIL. *Keynes's 'General Theory.'* New York: Macmillan Co., 1951. Pp. 76. $1.25.

PI SUNER, AUGUSTO. *The Bridge of Life, from Reality to Mystery.* New York: Macmillan Co. Pp. 277. $3.75.

PLATO. *Dialogues of Plato: Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Symposium, Republic.* Translated from the Greek by Benjamin Jowett. Edited by J. D. Kaplan. New York: Pocket Books, 1951. Pp. 399. Paper, 25¢.

———. *Phaedo.* Translated by F. J. Church. Introduction by Fulton H. Anderson. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1951. Pp. xviii + 74. Paper, 40¢.

This is the thirtieth volume in the invaluable "Little Library

of Liberal Arts." Like the preceding volumes, it is a real aid to student and teacher alike. The Introduction by Professor Anderson is good. Its style, however, is jerky; its presentation of Plato's thought moves somewhat confusingly from the general outlines of that thought to the special content of this work and back again.

POWYS, JOHN COWPER. *Rabelais.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1951. Pp. 424. $3.75.

First published in Great Britain, this book is almost another proof that the English literary mind is not capable of comprehending Rabelais. And yet the author of this work comes closer than most previous English writers. The book consists of four parts: a life, a summary of the story, selected passages (pp. 133-282), and an interpretation.

The author belabors the naturalness, the earthiness, the merry humour of the French writer; everything must fit within an anti-religious naturalism "skin for skin" (this phrase is used so often it must have some meaning). And all this, both good and bad, is tied up with the author's pet grievances (such as his revulsion against vivisection) and is wrapped up in an involuted verbose style, fearsome with learned and obscure literary allusions. The author seems wholly ignorant of Etienne Gilson's brilliant and sympathetic essay, "Rabelais franciscain."

PRATT, CARROLL C. *The Logic of Modern Psychology.* New York: Macmillan Co. $3.00.

PRENTICE, ROBERT P., O. F. M. *The Psychology of Love according to St. Bonaventure.* St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: Franciscan Institute Publs., 1951. Pp. xvi + 136. $2.00.

Proceedings of The American Catholic Philosophical Association. Washington: Catholic Univ. of America, 1951. Pp. 219. Paper, $3.00.

The *Proceedings* of the twenty-fifth annual meeting of the Association (held March 27 and 28, 1951) has as its general theme "The Nature of Man." Of the four papers delivered at the two general sessions, the first, by Professor Elizabeth Salmon, deals with "The Nature of Man in St. Augustine's Thought." Professor Salmon studies the unity and the duality of man, particularly as St. Augustine finds them in the experience of knowledge. The second paper, "St. Thomas and the Nature of Man," was delivered by Mr. Charles J. O'Neil. This is an excellent study of a frequently neglected, but extremely important, aspect of man—his nature as revealed in his moral (practical) activity. The third paper, by the Reverend George P. Klubertanz, S. J., is a summary report on "The Psychologists and the Nature of Man." It is an attempt to survey the modern work in experimental psychology and to point out items of use or interest for a philosopher. The fourth paper, by Professor Lawrence E. Lynch, considers "Existentialism and the Nature of Man." Professor Lynch singles out for special consideration Sartre and Marcel.

In addition there are the shorter papers delivered at the round table discussions, the presidential address by the Reverend Gerard Smith, S. J., the Association address by Professor Dietrich Von Hildebrand, the presentation of the Cardinal Spellman-Aquinas Medal to M. Jacques Maritain, and M. Maritain's response, as well as the reports on the business sessions.

RAU, CATHERINE. *Art and Society; a Reinterpretation of Plato.* New York: R. R. Smith. Pp. 88. $2.50.

READE, WILLIAM HENRY VINCENT. *The Christian Challenge to Philosophy.* Preface by Cyril Bailey. New York: Macmillan Co., 1951. Pp. 207. $2.75.

REICHENBACH, HANS. *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy.* Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1951. Pp. 346. $3.75.

REIK, THEODOR. *Dogma and Compulsion.* Translated from the German by Bernard Miall. New York: International Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. 332. $5.00.

REISER, OLIVER L. *Nature, Man, and God. A Synthesis of Pantheism and Scientific Humanism.* Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1951. Pp. ii + 152. Paper, $2.00.

This book proposes a single world outlook for all men, to be developed by the group effort of the world's great minds gathered at a world university. This world philosophy is to be scientific humanism—scientific, because science is the only method of attaining truth; humanism, in the sense that man is presently the highest product of evolution. Religion, considered as devotion to a superhuman power, is to be directed to the universe; hence it is to be pantheistic.

Apparently theories like this can refer to historical fact without being bound by it. When an author rejects both Aristotle and Plato because they both believe in timeless, eternal essences (this is merely a single example), philosophers with some respect for the requirements of their profession are bound to be dissatisfied.

RENOIRTE, FERNAND. *Cosmology.* Translated from the revised French edition by James F. Coffey. New York: Jos. F. Wagner, 1950. Pp. xv + 256. $3.50.

This volume is the third in the translation currently being made of the textbooks in the philosophical series of the Higher Institute of Philosophy, University of Louvain. The translation is adequate and easy.

Cosmology, according to its subtitle, is offered as an elementary textbook of "a critique of the sciences and of cosmology." It is divided into three parts: a critical study of some questions in positive science; elements of a critique of the sciences; and elements of cosmology. In evaluating the book, and particularly its first two parts, it must be remembered that it presupposes in its readers no more scientific knowledge "than what is usually received in high school courses in physics and chemistry" (p. iii). Furthermore, there is no analysis of motion or quantity, no mention of the virtual presence of elements in compounds; there are no suggestions for further reading and study. However, there may be curricula in which the bare minimum offered here is sufficient.

ROBINSON, DANIEL S. *Royce's Logical Essays.* Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown Co. Pp. 464. $5.00.

ROCKER, RUDOLF. *Nationalism and Culture.* Translated from the German by Ray E. Chase. 2d printing; Los Angeles: Rocker Pubns. Committee. Pp. 592. $4.00.

ROSENBLOOM, PAUL. *The Elements of Mathematical Logic.* New York: Dover Pubns. Pp. iv + 214. $2.95.

RUBISSOW, GEORGE A. *The House of Life.* New York: Ricardo Press. Pp. 381. $4.00.

RUEGG, S. DOMINIC. *Sancti Aurelii Augustini De utilitate ieiunii.* Text with translation, introduction, and commentary. Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1951. Pp. 148. Paper, $1.50.

RUNES, DAGOBERT D. *Spinoza Dictionary.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1951. $4.75.

RUSSELL, BERTRAND. *The Impact of Science on Society.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. vii + 64. $2.00.

This book consists of a series of lectures delivered on the Franklin J. Machette Foundation at Columbia University. The style is popular rather than learned (no footnotes, index, or bibliography). The content deals with "Science and Tradition"; "Effects of Scientific Technique"; and "Science and Values." The first paper is a slapdash attack on tradition (for example, "Shakespeare's *Macbeth* is a piece of government propaganda" [p. 7]). Science, liberalism or democracy, and toleration have gone hand in hand (the author conveniently neglects the egalitarian French Revolution). The second lecture gives a simplified history of the effects of scientific technique, not overlooking its connection with, and use in, present-day totalitarian societies. The third lecture seeks the greater good of mankind (that is, material prosperity which "provides a mood of kindly feeling" [p. 63]) through science, democracy, and birth control. Along the line of this argument, pragmatism, communism, and the Catholic Church are briefly tilted against. [*To be reviewed*]

RYAN, EDMUND JOSEPH, C.PP.S. *The Role of the "Sensus Communis" in the Psychology of St. Thomas Aquinas.* Carthegena, Ohio: Messenger Press, 1951. Pp. x + 198. Paper, Apply.

This doctoral dissertation is a careful historical and textual investigation of the *sensus communis.* In the first part, the author studies the sources of St. Thomas's doctrine, devoting a chapter each to Aristotle, Avicenna, Averroes, and St. Albert. In the second part, the Thomistic text is examined in detail; the doctrine of the various texts is then summarized and synthesized in masterly fashion. In the third part, modern experimental data are examined to see whether they can contribute anything to our understanding of this Thomistic doctrine. This is an important study.

There are a bibliography and an index. [*To be reviewed*]

SANTAYANA, GEORGE. *Dominations and Powers.* New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1951. Pp. xv + 481. $4.50.

Subtitled "Reflections on Liberty, Society and Government," this comprehensive study is the fruit of many years experience and reflection. The author himself contrasts the more moderate and impersonal view of this work with the more dogmatic earlier study (the second volume of *The Life of Reason*). The work is divided into three books. The first book, "The Generative Order of Society," studies the origin of society from disorder (but not in a historical manner) and the nature and functions of the economic and the liberal arts. The second book, "The Militant Order of Society," discusses conflict (war, propaganda, crime, and so forth) and enterprise. The third book, "The Rational Order of Society," considers the place of reason and rational order, the nature and function of government, democracy, representative government, and finally world order. [*To be reviewed*]

SAW, RUTH LYDIA. *The Vindication of Metaphysics. A Study in the Philosophy of Spinoza.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1951. Pp. 179. $2.00.

SCHLATTER, RICHARD BULGER. *Private Property.* New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. 283. $2.50.

Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. *De beneficiis, libri VII.* Edited by William Hardy Alexander. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1950. Pp. 45. Paper, 50¢.

Simon, Yves R. *Philosophy of Democratic Government.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1951. Pp. ix + 324. $3.50.

This is the second volume of the "Charles R. Walgreen Foundation Lectures." The author begins his discussion with a chapter on the general theory of government, in which he studies the function of authority. He then takes up democratic freedom, where he considers the vote, majority rule, the party system, and the instruments of government. The third chapter discusses various theories of sovereignty in democracy. The fourth looks into the nature of equality, treating of natural equality and inequality, structural inequality, and equality of opportunity. The fifth and last chapter discusses democracy and technology, the pursuit of happiness, education for freedom, and community and individual life. [*To be reviewed*]

Siwek, Paul, S. J. *The Philosophy of Evil.* New York: Ronald Press, 1951. Pp. ix + 226. $3.50.

This is a philosophical study of the nature and origin of evil. It is divided into three parts. In the first, evil is defined and its manifestations on the different levels of being investigated; in the second part, the finality of evil is considered on the vegetative, sensitive, and human levels; and in the third part, philosophical systems of pessimism and optimism are considered.

This book provides useful supplementary reading for courses in metaphysics, natural theology, and—to some extent—ethics; it will also be of help to the general reader.

There is an interesting digression on mechanist theories of life. The author's presentation of finality (pp. 50-51, 70-74) is stimulating though it is couched in language that seems somewhat anthropomorphic.

Slater, Robert Lawson. *Paradox and Nirvana: Burmese Buddhism and World Religion.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; March, 1951. Pp. 192. $4.00.

Smith, Gerard, S. J. *Natural Theology.* "The Christian Wisdom Series"; New York: Macmillan Co., summer, 1951.

Smith, Vincent Edward. *Footnotes for the Atom.* Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1951. Pp. xi + 208. $3.50.

This is a series of philosophical reflections on the implications of science for modern man, presented in an easy, informal essay style. The first chapter is a philosophical consideration of scientific method and its nature, value, and limitations. The second is a brief and summary account of atomic physical theory. The remaining chapters are introductory considerations to philosophical points. The third chapter, for example, considers being, trying to show its origin in experience and its meaning. Similar considerations of unity, power, and destiny are given. The author also touches on some basic ethical notions, as well as on tangential problems (for example, tools). The author frequently contrasts the philosophical approach to the misapplications of scientific method.

This book can be highly recommended for the general reader. It may also provide excellent collateral reading for courses in metaphysics.

SOMERVILLE, JOHN. *The Philosophy of Peace.* New York: Philosophy Books. $3.00.

SPENCER, HERBERT. *Literary Style and Music.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1951. Pp. x + 119.

There are four short essays in this book: "The Philosophy of Style," "The Origin and Function of Music," "Gracefulness," and "Use and Beauty." Charles T. Smith has a short introduction. Most of the essays date from Spencer's early life. They show his shrewd insight and ability to marshal pertinent facts. They also show his pronounced tendency to theorize: the essay on style builds heavily on the fragile framework of associationism; the one on music, on his own version of evolution.

SPINOZA, BENEDICT. *A Theologico-Political Treatise.* New York: Dover Pubns. Pp. 278. $3.50.

SPRANGER, EDUARD. *Types of Men.* Authorized translation of the 5th German ed. by Paul J. W. Pigors. New York: Hafner Pub. Co., 1951. Pp. 414. $6.00.

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STEPHENS, I. K. *The Hermit Philosopher of Liendo.* Dallas: Univ. Press in Dallas, 1951. Pp. 412. $5.00.

STRATHMANN, ERNEST A. *Sir Walter Raleigh.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. 301. $3.75.

Structure, Method and Meaning. Essays in Honor of Henry M. Sheffer. Edited by Paul Henle, Horace M. Kallen, and Susanne K. Langer. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1951. Pp. xvi + 306. $4.50.

The essays in the first part of this volume deal with problems in present-day formal logic. Those in the second part concern method or methodology. In this part there are several very valuable studies. C. J. Ducasse treats of "Francis Bacon's Philosophy of Science" and offers an important distinction between Bacon's theory and his practice; he also suggests that a very significant part of Bacon's contribution lies in what can be read between the lines. C. H. Kaiser studies the "Method of Methodology." This is an excellent and stimulating essay, characterized first of all by an inclusive attention to all methods and secondly by a sensitive appreciation of what people are trying to do with their different methods in their various fields. He decides that there are basically four methods—those of science, philosophy, art, and religion. He concludes that methodology ought to be considered a single distinct branch of learning and investigation. Marvin Farber, in his "Reflections on the Nature and Method of Philosophy," likewise has some pertinent observations to offer. Chief among them is his clear insistence that many of the facile solutions of philosophical problems (for example, that these problems are meaningless) are worthless because they miss the point. The essays in the third part have little connection with each other. Of some interest and value are those of Felix S. Cohen on "Field Theory and Judicial Logic" and Donald C. Williams on "The Sea Fight Tomorrow." [*Reviewed in this issue*]

SUAREZ, FRANCISCO, S. J. *Political Excerpts.* Translated by George Albert Moore. Chevy Chase: Country Dollar Press, 1951. Pp. 160. $5.50.

TAYLOR, GORDON RATTRAY. *Conditions of Happiness.* Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1951. Pp. 288. $3.50.

THILLY, FRANK, and WOOD, LEDGER. *A History of Philosophy.* Rev. ed.; New York: Henry Holt Co., 1951. Pp. 700. $4.50.

THOMAS AQUINAS, ST. *Truth (De Veritate).* Translated by Robert W. Mulligan, S. J., James V. McGlynn, S. J., and Robert Schmidt, S. J. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., Vol. I, spring, 1952; Vol. II, fall, 1952, Vol. III, spring, 1953. $7.00 per volume; special prepublication price, $6.00 per volume.

TIVERTON, WILLIAM. *D. H. Lawrence and Human Existence.* Foreword by T. S. Eliot. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1951. Pp. xv + 140. $3.00.

This is largely a work of literary criticism, but in a larger context of a philosophical and religious world view. The author considers Lawrence's writing as a lived reaction to shallow rationalism and scientism, as well as to the narrow superficial notion of personality concocted by associationists. Most modern psychologists treat personality at the level of action, conscious or unconscious; Lawrence seems to be striving for an expression of substantial being.

TOULMIN, STEPHEN. *The Place of Reason in Ethics.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press. $3.25.

TUCKEY, T. G. *Plato's Charmides.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. 125. $2.75.

ULAM, ADAM B. *Philosophical Foundations of English Socialism.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. Pp. 173. $3.75.

ULLMANN, STEPHEN. *Words and their Use.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1951. Pp. 108. $2.75.

This general introduction to linguistics, language analysis, and semantics is written in an elegant, smoothly flowing style, and is aimed at the well-educated reader. Its main content is linguistic; only briefly does it touch upon philosophical topics. By and large, the basic philosophy seems to be realist and intelligible. There is an excessive insistence on the absolute necessity of language for abstract thinking (p. 41) and for accurate thought (pp. 88-89). Philosophical authorities of the author seem to be Ogden and Richards, Bertrand Russell, and Korzybski. He voices a caution, however, against the excessive enthusiasm of some semanticists.

Vedanta for Modern Man. Edited with an introduction by Christopher Isherwood. New York: Harper & Bros., 1951. Pp. xiv + 410. $5.00.

This is a collection of sixty-two articles taken from the journal *Vedanta and the West,* 1945-51. They are selected to bring out various aspects of Vedanta philosophy. On a semipopular level, they do this very well.

Though it is not the authors' nor the editor's intention to bring out the problems of Vedanta, three problems appear very clearly. First, is Vedanta a philosophy, a religion, or *the* "religion back of all particular religions"? Secondly, if all religions are considered to be equally true, does "true" not really mean *false*? Thirdly, can one call the "external world" an illusion and still insist logically that one is not belittling its reality?

Indian thought is rightly held in high esteem because it has courageously faced one of the key problems in philosophy, the problem of the infinite and the finite. But until its followers are ready to accept all of the relevant data of experience, their solutions will continue to be deficient.

WATKIN, EDWARD INGRAM. *A Philosophy of Form.* 3d ed.; New York: Sheed & Ward, 1951. Pp. 470. $6.00.

WILLIAMS, GEORGE H. *The Norman Anonymous of 1100 A.D.* "Harvard Theological Studies," XVIII; Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. xiii + 236. Paper, $2.50.

This is a study of the origin and content of a codex of Corpus Christi College (415), whose author is ordinarily known as the "Anonymous of York." In the first part of this study, the author considers the evidences that can be brought to bear on the question of authorship and concludes that the author must have been an ecclesiastic of Rouen. He considers the various claims that might be advanced for Bishop William Giffard of Winchester, Archdeacon and Dean Fulbert of Rouen, and Archbishop William Bona Anima of Rouen (in the order of increasing probability). After this, the study takes up the doctrinal content of the tractates, centering the study around the notions of kingdom and priesthood; there emerges a doctrine of royal absolutism on a quasi-religious basis. The work concludes with an appendix containing hitherto unpublished sections of the codex. The value of this worthwhile study could have been increased by the addition of a bibliography and an index.

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